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Abstract:  
 
Recent advancements in microeconomics have resurrected a need for modern economists 
to grapple with principles of consumer behavior.  This dissertation uses the American 
beer market as a starting place to present three ways applied researchers can incorporate 
behavioral principles into economic theory.  The first essay uses choice experiments 
designed to estimate the price sensitivity of alcohol consumption to explore the efficacy 
of prompts targeted at reducing inattention bias.  Upon receiving feedback, inattentive 
respondents are given the opportunity to re-answer a so-called “trap question” that checks 
for attentiveness.  We find that individuals who miss trap questions and do not correctly 
revise their responses have significantly different choice patterns as compared to 
individuals who correctly answer the trap question.  The second essay proposes an 
instrumental variable approach to address the endogeneity issues associated with 
distinguishing preferences from perceptions.  Even after correction, we find 
beliefs/perceptions substantially affect consumer choices of beer brands, and that 
perceived taste and brand familiarity are key determinants of choice.  In the final essay, 
we empirically tests the effectiveness of two institutional nudges on the ECE in a field 
experiment at a bar.  Focusing on craft beer sales, we manipulate the number of options 
on the menu and use institutional nudges (a control menu, a menu with a special 
prominently displayed, and a menu with Beer Advocate scores).  In the field experiment, 
the ECE was alive and well using the control menu, but the effect reversed itself when 
the menu included Beer Advocate Scores.  Our results suggest the ECE might be turned 
on and off by manipulating search costs.  Taken together, these three essays show that 
that behavioral principles can enrich understanding of human action as it relates to 
consumer decision-making.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over the past half century, demand for value-added products has markedly shifted.  
Changes in technology, retailing, and incomes have led to a dramatic increase in the 
number of options from which consumers choose.  In the past, more standardized 
commodities made purchasing decisions simpler, and subsequent policy analyses could 
be based on simple models (Malone and Lusk, 2016a).  For many modern product 
markets, consumers must now consider an ever-increasing number of product-specific 
attributes, further complicating purchasing decisions.  Estimates indicate that the number 
of products in an average supermarket has exploded from fewer than 9,000 in 1975 to 
nearly 47,000 in 2008 (Consumer Reports, 2014).  Thus, it has become increasingly 
difficult for consumers to familiarize themselves with all options before they make a 
choice, as the cognitive cost of searching through many options is high.  In some markets, 
this can potentially lead to choice overload, where overwhelmed customers might opt out 
of choosing.  Without higher levels of familiarity, many consumer choices are more 
likely to be the outcome of unconscious perceptions rather than well-defined preferences. 
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Until now, consumer perceptions have remained a largely unexplored mechanism for 
empirically differentiating market participants.  American beer is one market that exemplifies 
this drastic increase in search costs over the past half-century.  At present, there are more 
breweries in the United States than ever before, and the growth trend shows little sign of 
slowing.  The number of U.S. breweries has grown from fewer than one hundred in the 
1980’s to over 4,000 in 2014 (Elzinga et al., 2015).  Even large traditional firms are now 
acquiring mid-sized craft breweries and experimenting with new styles in an effort to expand 
their product lines and reach new market segments (Malone and Lusk, 2017a).  Although the 
number of breweries has not reached the per capita levels achieved by the United States 
before Prohibition, the number of beers available in American markets has nonetheless 
reached astounding levels.  In total, the American beer market includes an estimated 30,000 
different choices, with the number of options varying from area to area.  Even consumers in 
Southern states like Georgia now have the opportunity to choose what beer they drink from 
more than 120 different domestic breweries (SeekaBrew, 2017).  This proliferation of options 
makes it very likely that consumers rely heavily on their perceptions to make purchasing 
decisions.  To date, the empirical literature on beer has generally focused on industrial 
organization and regulatory changes with little discussion of consumer behavior (Malone and 
Lusk, 2016).  While regulatory analyses remain important,1 models of heterogeneous 
consumer behavior in the beer market are likely to change policy recommendations. 
In the first chapter, we consider the heterogeneity of survey response quality, and 
propose a method for reducing the consequences of inattention bias.  Although survey-based 
methods are increasingly being used to estimate consumer preferences and judge the merits 
                                                          
1 One estimate suggests that there are approximately 90,000 federal regulatory burdens in the beer value chain 
(Malone and Chambers, 2017). 
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of policy and health interventions, there is growing concern about the quality of survey data.  
Using choice experiments designed to estimate the price sensitivity of alcohol consumption, 
this chapter explores the efficacy of prompts targeted at reducing inattention bias.  Upon 
receiving feedback, inattentive respondents are given the opportunity to re-answer a so-called 
“trap question” that checks for attentiveness.  We find that individuals who miss trap 
questions and do not correctly revise their responses have significantly different choice 
patterns as compared to individuals who correctly answer the trap question.  Adjusting for 
these inattentive responses has a substantive impact on policy impacts.  Our estimates, based 
on attentive respondents, indicate that a minimum beer price would have to be substantial to 
significantly reduce beer demand; a minimum price policy that increased the price of macro-
brewed beer by 57% would only reduce the share of consumers buying beer by 2.7 to 4.5 
percentage points.  We show that the ability of a minimum price policy to reduce beer 
consumption is mitigated by substitution toward craft beers, the prices of which are already 
higher and thus less impacted by the policy.   
The second chapter proposes an instrumental variable approach to address the 
endogeneity issues associated with distinguishing preferences from perceptions.  Recent 
developments in behavioral economics have prompted interest in identifying how product 
perceptions and consumer beliefs influence consumer choice.  Unfortunately, perceptions and 
preferences are likely to be endogenous, as there are likely to unobserved factors that 
influence both.  Finding credible instruments for economic work in this area has emerged as 
a key challenge.  Using a branded discrete choice experiment for beer, this chapter uses the 
control function approach to identify a plausible instrument to correct for the endogeneity 
problem in a way that is applicable in a wide range of circumstances.  Specifically, we build 
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on the assumption that the perceptions of (or beliefs about) a specific product are likely to be 
correlated with the perceptions of other related products, but that preference for the product 
of interest are not likely correlated with the perceptions of (or beliefs about) other related 
products.  Results indicate that this method can successfully correct for endogeneity, and that 
the endogeneity correction significantly affects estimates.  Even after correction, we find 
beliefs/perceptions substantially affect consumer choices.  In the context of beer brands, we 
find that the perceived taste and brand familiarity are key determinants of choice. 
The third chapter, published in the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental 
Economics, focuses on a group of market participants who allegedly violate a common 
assumption in economics models.  Research in psychology suggests that, somewhat 
paradoxically, providing consumers more choices can reduce the likelihood of making a 
purchase, producing the so-called excessive choice effect (ECE). To the extent an ECE 
exists, firms have an incentive to alleviate the effect through a variety of institutional nudges 
that promote consumers to make a choice.  This study empirically tests the effectiveness of 
two institutional nudges on the ECE in a field experiment at a bar.  Focusing on craft beer 
sales, we manipulate the number of options on the menu and use institutional nudges (a 
control menu, a menu with a special prominently displayed, and a menu with Beer Advocate 
scores).  In the field experiment, the ECE was alive and well using the control menu, but the 
effect reversed itself when the menu included Beer Advocate Scores.  Our results suggest the 
ECE might be turned on and off by manipulating search costs. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
RELEASING THE TRAP: A METHOD TO REDUCE INATTENTION BIAS IN 
SURVEY DATA WITH APPLICATION TO U.S. BEER TAXES 
 
 
Surveys are a mainstay in the social sciences, and choice experiments, in particular, have 
become a widely used tool to elicit consumer preferences in the heath economics 
literature (de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012).  Yet eliciting quality responses has become an 
increasingly difficult task (Curtin, Presser, and Singer, 2005; Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan, 
2015).  Individuals have limited capacities for processing information, making it 
perfectly rational for a survey respondent to inattentively complete a survey.  In an effort 
to identify the most problematic participants, some researchers now include “screeners” 
or “trap questions” to identify which participants are most likely to be inattentive 
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko, 2009).  Asking questions that have an 
unambiguously correct answer allow survey designers to identify who is and is not 
paying attention during the survey.  Between a quarter and a half of the respondents in 
previous surveys miss the trap question, indicating that they are not paying attention 
(Maniaci and Rogge, 2014).  The convention has been to delete these inattentive  
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participants from the sample.  However, this practice has the potential to restrict the study’s 
representativeness and external validity (Aronow, Baron, and Pinson, 2016).  Furthermore, 
omitting up to half of a sample is likely to be costly.  As such, there is a clear need for a method 
that might reduce participant inattention without inviting selection bias.   
If inattention simply increased noise, the error term might exhibit higher variance, but 
parameters would remain unbiased.  Unfortunately, research has shown that inattention can 
substantively bias policy-relevant estimates, making inattention bias an important issue for 
survey research (Malone and Lusk, 2017).  In the case of choice experiments, inattentive survey 
respondents tend to pay less attention to price changes, resulting in higher willingness-to-pay 
estimates.  In this article, we propose an easy-to-implement method to reduce the measurement 
error associated with inattention bias.  Before the battery of choice questions, we ask a question 
with an obvious answer designed to “trap” inattentive respondents into incorrectly answering.  If 
the participant misses the trap question, we gently nudge participant to pay attention and provide 
them an opportunity to revise the incorrect response.  Our results show that removing 
participants who do not revise their responses improves data quality.  Additionally, we find that 
this simple reminder can improve subsequent policy recommendations without introducing 
additional bias. 
By applying this method to an online discrete choice experiment for beer, we seek to 
contribute to an ongoing policy discussion.  While alcohol consumption has been heavily studied 
in the health economics literature (e.g. Wagenaar, Salois, and Komro 2009 identified over a 
thousand demand elasticity estimates in the literature), most estimates generally focus on beer as 
a commodity.  Moreover, previous approaches have relied on aggregate time-series data that are 
likely to suffer from problems associated with endogeneity.  Only rarely have any segment-
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specific estimates been published (Toro-González, McCluskey, and Mittelhammer, 2014), 
making it difficult to determine the consequences of policies that exempt certain types of beer 
from taxation.   
These shortcomings are particularly problematic for the beer market in the United States, 
where the craft segment beer market has experienced rapid expansion.  As such, the United 
States is home to more breweries today than ever before (Hahn, 2016).  While macro brewers 
like Anheuser-Busch InBev and MillerCoors still comprise nearly three quarters of the domestic 
market (Tremblay, Tremblay, and Swinnen, 2011), craft breweries comprise the largest growth 
area for the beer market.  Policymakers across the country are considering changes to promote 
the burgeoning craft breweries, and it has been proposed, for example, to exempt craft beers 
from certain alcohol taxes.  A complete analysis of such public policies requires data on 
segment- or brand-specific own- and cross-price demand elasticities because some tax policies 
may induce substitution effects, which may counteract the intended effects of policies (i.e., to 
reduce the externalities associated with alcohol consumption).  To date, few demand studies 
account for the likely differences between craft and macro segments (Bray, Loomis, and 
Engelen, 2009; Toro-González, McCluskey, and Mittelhammer, 2014), and those that have 
focused on purchases for consumption at home rather than consumption away from home (i.e., at 
a restaurant or bar).  Our choice experiment on beer builds on the existing literature by focusing 
on macro- and micro-brands in an away-from-home setting, thereby increasing policy-relevant 
information regarding alcohol taxes, and the projection of the effects of such taxes on public 
health outcomes. 
The overall objective of this article is to estimate the effects of changes in U.S. beer 
policy on alcohol consumption via a discrete choice experiment that includes a new method to 
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reduce measurement error caused by inattention.  In the following section, we provide a 
background on the literature relevant to inattention bias in surveys and then introduce some of 
the literature related to beer taxes.  In the third section, we describe the data and methods in 
further detail, providing additional motivation for controlling for inattention, and explicitly 
describe how we use trap questions with feedback to minimize the consequences of inattention 
bias.  Our aim is to identify a method that might encourage participants to consider their 
responses more attentively.  Fourth, we discuss the results of our discrete choice experiment and 
implications for beer taxes.  The final section concludes with a brief review of our findings and 
recommendations for future research. 
 
Background 
While stated preference techniques can provide more control for making causal inferences, 
surveys are hampered by quality of responses.  This article explores a new approach that 
minimizes measurement error due to inattention bias.  Related to this approach is the use of 
“cheap talk” and consequential scripts, which inform participants of the tendency to exaggerate 
willingness-to-pay (Cummings and Taylor, 1999; Jacquemet et al., 2013).  Cheap talk scripts 
can, in some instances, reduce hypothetical bias by reminding participants that their responses 
are consequential (List, 2001; Lusk, 2003).  Unlike cheap-talk and hypothetical-bias, inattention 
is clearly and quickly identifiable at the individual level, and our method includes a “prompt” 
only to those respondents who need it.   
We focus on choice experiments, as they have become a popular way to determine 
impacts of consumer-focused policies (Bryan and Dolan, 2004).  Dozens of journal articles were 
published in health economics between 2001 and 2014 that utilized choice experiments, covering 
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a wide range of topics (Clark et al., 2014).  As choice experiments have become more common, 
so too have concerns regarding the validity of the method’s results (Bryan and Dolan, 2004; de 
Bekker‐Grob, Ryan, and Gerard, 2012).  A common concern is that participants choose to ignore 
one or more attributes when deciding between alternatives.  In some instances, participants might 
neglect an attribute because they are indifferent to one or all of the attributes or attribute levels 
(Carlsson et al., 2010).  It might also be that the non-attendance is not created by inattention, but 
rather, the participant simply has a dominant preference for a specific attribute levels, making 
other attributes irrelevant (Scott, 2002).  Regardless of the cause, “attribute non-attendance” has 
the potential to bias policy parameters (Hole, 2011).  To adjust for these issues, some researchers 
recommend asking participants ex post whether they ignored any of the attributes (Hole, Kolstad, 
and Gyrd-Handsen, 2013) while others infer attribute non-attendance econometrically (Hensher 
and Greene, 2010).  In this study, we focus on a related issue: that some proportion of 
participants inattentively answer entire survey questions (not just particular attributes), creating 
measurement error due to inattention bias.  That is, we study inattention broadly – as whether 
someone pays attention to the survey itself – as opposed to the narrow way it has been studied in 
the attribute non-attendance literature, which confounds preferences for attributes (or lack 
thereof) with careless inattention.   
 
Inattention Bias 
A main purpose of this article is to test a method for identifying inattention while preserving the 
external validity of the discrete choice experiment.  Specifically, we test the effectiveness of 
providing feedback to individuals who miss “trap questions.”2  These types of questions are 
                                                          
2 Trap questions are synonymous with “validation” or “red herring” questions.  Additionally, “screeners” or 
Instructional Manipulation Checks (IMCs) are a specific type of trap question where a participant is instructed to 
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crafted to identify inattention on surveys, often classifying a third to a half of all participants as 
“satisficing” or inattentive (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko, 2009; Berinsky, Margolis, 
and Sances, 2014).  A typical trap question seeks to identify participants who briefly skim a 
task’s instructions by providing the real sub-directions hidden within the larger overall 
instructions (e.g., a participant might be asked simply to check “strongly agree” to a particular 
item).  Those who miss trap questions tend to be willing to pay more and are not as consistent in 
their responses, suggesting the possibility of higher error variance and even bias among people 
who miss trap questions (Gao,  House, and Xie, 2015; Jones, House, and Gao, 2015; Malone and 
Lusk, 2017).   
Often, the convention has been to delete these participants from the sample, as 
eliminating these observations has been shown to increase statistical power (Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, and Davidenko, 2009).  However, this convention can prove problematic as data 
collection is costly, and throwing out responses is akin to throwing away money.  Furthermore, 
deleting these participants has the potential to threaten the survey’s external validity by biasing 
the survey sample (Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances, 2014; Lancsar and Louviere, 2006).  Instead, 
we argue that two types of people might mis-respond to a trap question – the inattentive 
participant who is unconcerned with providing honest answers to the survey, and the inattentive 
participant who simply needs to be reminded to pay more attention.  Thus, we propose a simple 
approach that might “rescue” inattentive respondents: provide a simple prompt to people who 
miss a trap question requesting that they read more carefully.    
 
 
                                                          
ignore the response format and select a specific answer (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 2009; Berinsky, 
Margolis, and Sances 2014).  For clarity, we refer to them throughout as trap questions. 
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Beer Taxes 
An extensive literature has identified negative externalities associated with heavy drinking.  Beer 
constitutes more than half of the ethanol consumed in America, making governments keenly 
interested in the way policies might influence consumption habits (LaVallee and Yi, 2011).  
Additionally, beer has been identified as the alcoholic beverage most commonly consumed by 
binge drinkers (Naimi et al., 2007).  Historically, restrictions on alcohol distribution have been 
used to minimize alcohol consumption (Fosdick and Scott, 1933), but those restrictions have the 
potential to reduce business development (Malone and Lusk, 2016) and subsequently raise 
concerns regarding corruption (Gohmann, 2016)  
Another classic response to these negative externalities is a Pigouvian tax (Cesur and 
Kelly, 2014).  By incorporating alcohol’s negative externalities into the price of a pint, the 
consumption effects can be more directly targeted.  Most research indicates that aggregate beer 
demand is generally price and income inelastic, making the beverage nearly “recession-proof” 
(Freeman, 2001) and implying that beer taxes might be less effective than other methods of 
reducing consumption (Nelson, 2014).  Partially in response to these challenges, some 
policymakers have advocated modified tax structures that effectively impose minimum prices on 
alcoholic beverages (Ludbrook, 2009; Craven, Marlow, and Shiers, 2013).  The notion of taxing 
alcohol via a minimum price mechanism recently merited a special section of the journal Alcohol 
and Alcoholism (Callinan, Room, and Dietze, 2015).  European countries such as Scotland have 
already implemented a similar policy, and some have argued that the United States should follow 
suit (Brennan et al., 2015).  American policymakers might be especially interested in this tax 
scheme given the aforementioned shift in the beer market with growing craft-beer consumption.  
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In fact, current proposals such as the Craft Beverage Modernization and Tax Reform Act already 
propose differing tax rates based on brewery size. 
Of primary interest to this article is the influence of tax policies on consumer choice.  We 
evaluate the consequences of a minimum price per pint, as the effectiveness of this policy is 
likely to be influenced by substitution effects across beer brands.  For this study, we determine 
the minimum price that would have to be set to reduce beer consumed away from home in the 
United States by 1%.  A choice experiment is appropriate to determine the effects of the policy 
as some beers would not be subject to this type of pricing policy.  As such, substitution effects 
have the potential to mitigate the impacts of this policy, as consumers are likely to substitute 
toward similar products such as craft beer, which are not taxed as heavily.  Assuming away 
substitution effects might indicate to policymakers that minimum pricing would more effectively 
reduce drinking habits than would be the case in reality.  In the following section, we explain our 
data-collection and estimation methods. 
 
Data and Methods 
We employ a discrete choice experiment for beer choice with the population of interest being 
beer drinkers in the United States.  Although most commonly used in the transportation, 
environmental, and agricultural economics literature, the discrete choice experiment has become 
increasingly popular in the health economics literature (de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012).   While 
there are concerns about so-called “hypothetical bias”, previous research has shown that such 
bias is less of a problem when estimating marginal changes (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001; 
Lusk and Schoeder, 2004).  Moreover, prior research has shown that preferences measured via 
stated preference choice experiments are consistent with those inferred from revealed preference 
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data (Hensher, Lourivere, and Swait, 1998; Louviere, Hensher, and Swait, 2000) and by 
combining both types of data, improved predictions can be obtained (Brooks and Lusk, 2010; 
Swait and Andrews, 2003). Moreover, choice experiment data have been shown to exhibit high 
levels of external validity (Chang, Lusk, and Norwood. 2009).  Choice experiments can 
complement the extant literature on beer demand relying on secondary data in several ways.  
Choice experiments provide increased control by avoiding potential context-specific confounds.  
By designing experiments where attributes are uncorrelated with one another, it also avoids 
endogeneity concerns and concerns about unobserved quality attributes.  Moreover, choice 
experiments allow the researcher to identify individual- specific information more clearly than 
secondary data. 
We utilized a simple “branded” choice experiment, where individuals chose between six 
different beer brands at a given set of prices.  A main effects orthogonal fractional factorial 
design was employed to assign prices to brands; the final design consisted of eight choice 
questions in which the price of each brand was uncorrelated with the price of other brands.  Each 
person answered all eight choice questions (Figure 1).  To control for effects related to beer type, 
all beers were lagers.  Participants were given the following instructions: “We are interested in 
the types of beer you like to buy.  Imagine you’re at a bar or restaurant.  In what follows, we will 
ask you 8 different choice questions, and in each question we would like to know which type of 
beer you most prefer when you buy a pint of beer.”  Participants chose between six randomly 
ordered beers: Miller Lite, Budweiser, Sam Adams Boston Lager, Marshall Old Pavilion Pilsner, 
and Oskar Blues Mama’s Little Yella Pils at price combinations of $3 and $6, or respondents 
could choose “none”.  We included Miller Lite and Budweiser to represent domestic 
macrobreweries.  As a proxy for import brands, we used Corona, as it is America’s largest 
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import (Tremblay, Tremblay, and Swinnen, 2011).  We included Sam Adams Boston Lager as 
Sam Adams is the largest American craft brewery.  Two smaller beer brands (Mama’s Little 
Yella Pils from Oskar Blues Brewing in Colorado and Old Pavilion Pilsner from Marshall 
Brewing in Oklahoma) were included to represent microbreweries. 
We used a between-subject design to test for the effect of different trap question 
approaches.  Participants were randomly assigned into a control group (N=547), a group given a 
long version of a trap question (N=559), and a group given a version of a trap question 
embedded in a Likert scale (N=591).  The first trap question directed participants to select 
“High” on a Likert scale if they live in the United States (Figure 2A).  If participants “straight-
line” through the scale, they will be unlikely to see these directions, as the instructions originally 
ask the participant, “How would you rate your familiarity with each of the following brands?”  
For the second trap question, we use a multiple-choice question where the true instructions direct 
the participant to click “None of the above” (Figure 2B).  Inattentive participants would be more 
likely to skim the long instructions, and then select their current emotional state.  We 
hypothesize that this style of trap question will catch a higher number of inattentive participants 
than will the first trap question, as the cognitive effort required for a correct response is higher.  
Additionally, we hypothesize that a larger portion of participants will correctly revise their 
response once provided feedback, as a simple reading of the full instructions makes it clear what 
response is correct.  This is likely to occur because Likert scales are often tedious for 
participants, and requiring an already-inattentive participant to revise responses on a Likert scale 
is likely to make the process even more tedious.   
Instead of simply identifying survey participants who might be inattentive, we notified 
participants who responded incorrectly.  Participants who incorrectly responded were given the 
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following prompt, “You appear to have misunderstood the previous question.  Please be sure to 
read all directions clearly before you respond.”  The respondent then had the chance to revise 
their answers to the trap question they missed.   
Data were collected in May 2015 with the population of interest being U.S. beer 
consumers.  Participants were recruited online through the company SSI and the survey was 
conducted using Qualtrics (N=1,697).  SSI recruits its panel of participants through a variety of 
means including phone calls and online ads, and offers a nominal award of approximately 
$1.50/survey in gift cards for completing surveys.  We utilized a screener question that 
eliminated non-beer drinkers from the sample.  Men make up 54.15% of our sample, and 42.07% 
of the participants are under 45 years of age.  Nearly 15% of our participants live in a city of 
more than 1,000,000 residents and 34.84% of the participants identified themselves as drinking 
craft beer at least once a week.  Our data indicate millennials aged 21 to 34 tend to be most likely 
to drink craft beer frequently, while adults 55 years or older are not as likely to drink craft beer. 
We estimate a series of random parameter logit models to compare the choice behavior of 
participants who either correctly responded to the trap question or correctly revised their 
response and participants who did not correctly revise their response.  We define participant n’s 
utility of selecting beer choice j in choice option s as: 
(1)                                        𝑈𝑗𝑠𝑛 = 𝛼𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑗𝑠 + 𝛽𝑗𝑛 + 𝜀𝑗𝑠𝑛 
where 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑗𝑠 is the price of choice j in choice s, 𝛼 is the marginal (dis)utility of the price, 𝛽𝑗𝑛 
indicates the utility of beer j relative to the “none” option which is normalized to zero for 
identification purposes and 𝜀𝑗𝑠𝑛 is the unobserved portion of the utility function.   
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To account for heterogeneity, we estimate random parameter logit models.3  Each of the 
“alternative-specific constants” 𝛽𝑗𝑛 are assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean β?̅? 
and standard deviation 𝜎𝑗, making the alternative specific constant take on the distribution β?̅? +
𝜆𝑗𝑛𝜎𝑗, where 𝜆𝑗𝑛 is a draw from the standard normal probability distribution function (Train, 
2009).  Assuming the 𝜀𝑗𝑠𝑛 are distributed iid Type I extreme value, the probability of individual n 
choosing beer j in option s is: 
  (2)                           𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑛𝑗𝑠 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(β?̅? + 𝜆𝑗𝑛𝜎𝑗)/ ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑘̅̅ ̅ + 𝜆𝑘𝑛𝜎𝑘)
9
𝑘=1 .  
The above probability statement contains the random terms, 𝜆𝑗𝑛, which must be integrated out of 
the likelihood function.  To achieve this task, we utilize simulated maximum likelihood 
estimation and utilize 1,000 Halton draws for each 𝜆𝑘𝑛.  
In this study, we provided inattentive participants with the opportunity to revise their 
incorrect response, effectively “untrapping” themselves and thereby implying that they will be 
more attentive.  As a prelude to the policy analysis, we explore the price sensitivity of attentive 
and inattentive respondents.  In particular, we estimate the change in the probability of not 
purchasing a beer when all beer prices are increased 1% (percentage changes can be found in the 
Appendix).  Base prices for each beer j are based on national averages generated by the 
consulting firm Restaurant Sciences, LLC (Jennings, 2013) where the price of Budweiser and 
Miller Lite are $3.50, Corona and Sam Adams are $5.00, and Marshall and Oskar Blues are 
$5.25. 
                                                          
3 It could be that differences between coefficients across treatments are due to differences in error variance (or scale) 
rather than differences in underlying preferences (Swait and Louviere, 1993).  As such, we also estimated models 
that allow for differences in scale across treatment, but determined that estimating separate models fit the data better.  
Results from these tests, along with standard MNL models, are in included in the Appendix. 
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To estimate the consequences of minimum pricing legislation, we use the same base 
prices and consider several minimum price policies starting with a minimum price policy of 
$3.50/pint and working up (in $0.50 increments) to a minimum price policy of $5.50/pint.  The 
outcome of interest is the effect of the policy on the probability of not choosing a beer (since the 
goal of the policy is to reduce consumption).  Because craft beers are already higher priced ex 
ante, minimum price policies will have differential effects on macro and craft beers.  For 
example, a $5.00/pint minimum price policy increases the price of Bud and Miller from $3.50 to 
$5 (a 42.8% increase), but the policy does not affect the prices of the microbreweries (which are 
already above the minimum at $5.25).  As a result, the policy will cause a shift away from macro 
to craft beer and not toward “no purchase” as the policy was perhaps intended.  To derive 
standard errors on the probability of “no purchase”, we follow the method outlined by Krinsky 
and Robb (1986) with 1,000 random draws.   
 
Results 
547, 559, and 591 participants were randomly assigned to the control, embedded trap question, 
and long trap question treatment groups, creating at least 4,300 individual choices per treatment.  
A chief concern about the inclusion of trap questions is the potential for widespread protest-like 
behavior, although trap questions themselves have not been found to bias responses (Berinsky, 
Margolis, and Sances, 2014).  It might be that the obvious nature of the trap question offends 
respondents, thereby confounding the results from the choice experiment.  It might also be that 
our feedback has the potential to increase social desirability bias, as warning messages embedded 
within a choice experiment have been shown to do (Clifford and Jerit 2015).  To test this 
concern, we tested whether the choice experiment model parameters were the same for the 
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treatment and control groups in aggregate.  Table 1 shows the random parameter logit estimation 
results for the control treatment and the full dataset.  A likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null 
that the preference parameters were equal across the two treatments and control, indicating that 
inclusion of the trap question, per se, does not significantly alter parameter estimates 
(𝜒𝑑𝑓=26,0.05
2 =18.6, p-value = 0.881).  Another concern regarding the use of trap questions is that 
they might increase attrition rates.  We do not find this to be the case.  In fact, our findings 
indicate the opposite: across all treatments, 91.04% of all participants who opened the survey 
completed it, while the completion rate for the control group was only 80.6%. 
Signs and significance of parameter estimates in table 1 are all as expected.  In the full 
dataset, the average participant appears to derive the most utility from Corona or Sam Adams as 
the mean utilities are 3.306 and 3.442 (estimated relative to “none” which is normalized to zero 
for identification).  There also appears to be substantial heterogeneity in preferences, as the 
estimated standard deviations are all over three.   In the control group, the random parameter 
estimate of the mean preference for Oskar Blues was not statistically different from zero, 
although the estimated standard deviation for Oskar Blues is 4.437, indicating that approximately 
half of the control sample have a positive utility for the brand, and half negative. 
    
Embedded Trap Question - Results 
In the treatment with the trap question embedded in a Likert scale, 21.82% of the 559 
participants incorrectly responded to the first iteration.  When notified of their wrong response, 
53 of the 122 originally incorrect responses changed their response to a correct answer.  Relative 
to the control, a larger percentage of participants in this treatment actually completed the survey, 
as the completion rate for this treatment was 96.88%.  Time to complete did not vary across 
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inattentiveness; participants who responded correctly to the trap question completed the survey 
in 19 minutes, 47 seconds, while participants who incorrectly responded took 19 minutes, 30 
seconds.  A likelihood ratio test indicates participants who correctly answered the embedded trap 
question the first time are not statistically different (𝜒𝑑𝑓=13,0.05
2 = 20, p-value = 0.52) from the 
participants who correctly revised the embedded trap question after we prompt (estimates for 
these separate groups can be found in the Appendix), suggesting our prompt caused inattentive 
participants to become attentive. 
Table 2 shows the parameter estimates for those in the embedded trap question treatment.  
Parameter estimates for persons who revised their responses were statistically different from 
those who did not revise their responses and who were persistently inattentive (𝜒𝑑𝑓=13,0.05
2 =
48.4, p-value < 0.001).  We conclude that attentive and persistently inattentive participants 
exhibit different preferences.  Estimated standard deviations are all smaller for the persistently 
inattentive participants than for the attentive participants, and parameter estimates for Corona, 
Sam Adams, and Marshall are all larger for attentive participants.  Most importantly, the 
parameter estimate for price is significantly lower for attentive participants (-0.613) than for 
inattentive participants (-0.348).  As such, this difference indicates that persistently inattentive 
participants on average have a lower marginal disutility for price. 
 
Long Trap Question - Results 
An even larger percentage of the sample finished in the long trap question treatment versus the 
embedded trap question treatment as the completion rate was 97.20%.  Of the 591 participants 
randomly allocated to this treatment, 25.38% of participants answered incorrectly to the long 
version of the trap question.  When notified of their wrong answer in the long trap question, 98 
20 
 
of the 150 originally incorrect responses were changed to a correct answer.  Incorrect 
respondents took 13 minutes, 10 seconds on average to complete the survey while correct 
respondents took 15 minutes, 30 seconds to complete the survey, although this difference was 
not statistically significant (t-stat =1.16, p-value = 0.24).  This group completed the survey in a 
notably shorter period as participants were not required to complete a Likert-type scale in the 
same fashion as the previous treatment.  A likelihood ratio test indicates that parameter estimates 
for participants who correctly answered the long trap question the first time were still statistically 
different (𝜒𝑑𝑓=13,0.05
2  = 183.2, p-value < 0.001) from the participants who correctly revised the 
long trap question after we prompt (estimates can be found in the Appendix).  An additional 
likelihood ratio test indicates that participants who incorrectly revised and were persistently 
inattentive generated statistically different parameter estimates than did the participants who 
correctly revised their response to the long trap question after the prompt (𝜒𝑑𝑓=13,0.05
2 = 49.4, p-
value < 0.001).  In other words, while participants who revised were still different from the 
participants who responded correctly, they were also different from the persistently inattentive 
participants. 
Table 3 shows the parameter estimates for those who missed the trap questions and did 
not revise to correct their wrong response (i.e., those who were persistently inattentive) versus 
those who did revise or correctly answered the first iteration of the trap question.  Parameter 
estimates for persistently inattentive participants were statistically different from those who did 
correctly revise their responses or correctly responded to the first iteration of the trap question 
(𝜒𝑑𝑓=12,0.05
2  = 276.8, p-value < 0.001).  Standard deviations are all larger for attentive 
participants than for inattentive participants, but there is no clear pattern in the differences 
between random parameter estimates.  Most importantly, the parameter estimate for price is 
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significantly higher for attentive participants (-0.829) than for inattentive participants (-0.102).  
This difference again indicates that persistently inattentive participants appear to have a 
substantively higher marginal disutility for price.  The price parameter difference indicates that 
demand for beer is more inelastic than actually might be the case, potentially leading to different 
policy recommendations and elasticities. 
 
Policy Implications 
Inattention bias has the potential to significantly influence policy estimates (Malone and Lusk, 
2017).  Table 4 displays the elasticity of beer for each group of participants.  Results from the 
control group are consistent with the previous literature as the elasticity for beer in this treatment 
is -0.202%, which closely matches the demand elasticity estimated by Nelson (2014).  
Participants in the embedded trap question treatment were less price sensitive than those in the 
long trap question treatment.  Both treatments, however, yield different elasticities than the 
control treatment; demand for beer was more elastic for correct respondents in both treatments 
than for the control group, even though the 95% confidence intervals of the control and 
embedded trap question treatments overlapped. Indeed, for both the embedded and long trap 
questions, the price increases affects persistently inattentive respondents less than correct 
respondents.  Specifically, respondents who did not revise their answers in the embedded trap 
question treatment only decrease their probability of drinking by -0.094% in response to an 
across the board 1% increase in beer prices compared to -0.182% for respondents who correctly 
answered or revised.  For the long trap question, respondents who did not revise only decreased 
their probability of drinking by -0.013% compared to -0.330% for attentive respondents.  At this 
point, it is a bit unclear why the attentive respondents in the long trap question were more elastic 
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than attentive respondents in the embedded trap question.  The key point is that the respondents 
who remained persistently inattentive even after the prompt were less price sensitive than the 
control or the attentive respondents, and that the elasticities from the persistently inattentive 
respondents are much more inelastic, and therefore biased, in comparison with what has been 
estimated in previous literature. 
We now turn toward estimating the effects of minimum price policies.  Table 5 shows the 
probability of not selecting a beer for several minimum price policies.  When only Budweiser 
and Miller Lite are priced at the minimum price of $3.50, we estimate between 5.45% and, 
8.22% of the control group do not drink beer.  From implementing the nudge and omitting 
persistently inattentive participants in the long trap question treatment, we find that up to 10.99% 
of our sample would not select a beer.  By contrast, the embedded trap question treatment 
indicates that fewer people would change their drinking habits, although the difference is not 
statistically different from the control group.  
 While the intended effect of a minimum pricing policy is to reduce the amount of alcohol 
consumed, unintended consequences arise when there are substitution possibilities.  Because we 
assumed all of the craft options cost at least $5.00, a minimum beer price might cause some 
consumers to opt for a craft beer substitute whose price remains unaffected.  Table 6 shows the 
increase in the purchase of craft beers (Sam Adams, Oskar Blues, and Marshall) as the minimum 
price increases in $0.50 increments.  When the minimum price is $4.00, we would expect a one 
percent increase in the demand for craft beer.  Contrast this to the change in the quantity of none, 
which would take a $5.00 minimum price to achieve a similar change.     
  
 
23 
 
 
Discussion 
Instead of generating quality responses, surveys incentivize inattention by tying payment to 
survey completion.  We contribute to the literature on survey quality by testing an ex ante 
method to deal with inattention in choice experiments through feedback.  Although not all 
participants correctly revise their answers, those who did provide statistically different answers.  
While notifying participants that they incorrectly answered a trap question might not entice all 
misresponders to pay more attention, it does have the potential to identify the most problematic 
in the sample set.  We take our results to mean that the answers of “untrapped” participants are 
more consistent with a thoughtful response. 
Trap questions can be useful for identifying the inattentive participants who might 
introduce measurement error, yet not all trap questions are as successful at identifying 
respondent inattention.  Of the two most commonly used trap question, the long trap question 
appears to be most appropriate for our method.  Rather than simply catching inattentive 
participants, we show that providing feedback to those who incorrectly respond to this trap 
question significantly alters parameter estimates.  Nudging participants with a long trap question 
appears to most appropriately deal with inattention bias.  Practitioners would benefit from taking 
this approach, as it shows potential to minimize measurement error in online surveys.  Future 
research might consider similar methods for other data-collecting methods as they have the 
potential to generate different parameter estimates (Mjelde, Kim, and Lee, 2016).  It is possible 
that reminding inattentive participants to pay attention will be incentive enough to reduce 
inattention bias, but we cannot conclusively claim that simply catching participants entirely 
eliminate participant inattention.   
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Even when we control for inattention, we would only expect slight changes in 
consumption habits from a tax policy.  On the upper end, a one percent tax on all beers would 
not even lead to a 0.2% decrease in the number of beers demanded away from home.  It would 
take a minimum beer price of at least $5.00 to reduce beer consumption by 2% from current 
levels.  Even those changes are likely to be overestimated for heavy drinkers, as it is generally 
believed that binge drinkers are less sensitive to price than the general population.  It is also 
important to remember that taxes are likely to have varying effects for different socio-economic 
characteristics.  Future research might consider changes in consumer behavior across socio-
economic characteristics.   
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Figure 2.1. Example choice experiment question 
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Figure 2.2A. Short Trap Question Embedded in a List 
 
 
Figure 2.2B. Long Trap Questiona 
aTwenty different emotions are listed after the question, with the final option being “none of the 
above.” 
 
 
 
Table 2.1. Random parameter logit estimates for treatments and all data 
  Control Long Trap Question Embedded Trap Question  Full Dataset 
 Mean of random parameter 
Budweiser 1.812*a (0.276) b 2.044*  (0.287) 1.892*  (0.297) 1.976*  (0.170) 
Miller Lite 0.841*  (0.332) 1.451*  (0.331) 1.009*  (0.354) 1.206*  (0.184) 
Corona 3.063*  (0.256) 3.282*  (0.218) 2.530*  (0.276) 3.306*  (0.135) 
Sam Adams 4.111*  (0.234) 3.390*  (0.227) 3.504*  (0.243) 3.442*  (0.129) 
Oskar Blues -0.479    (0.375) 0.311    (0.336) 0.103    (0.365) 0.508*  (0.172) 
Marshall 0.673*  (0.317) 1.341*  (0.284) 0.668    (0.357) 0.785*  (0.190) 
 Nonrandom parameter 
Price -0.659*  (0.024) -0.563*  (0.021) -0.692* (0.024) -0.634* (0.013) 
 Standard deviation of random parameter 
Budweiser 4.035*  (0.287) 4.059*  (0.320) 4.468*  (0.296) 4.007*  (0.162) 
Miller Lite 4.752*  (0.402) 3.607*  (0.252) 4.157*  (0.307) 4.198*  (0.180) 
Corona 3.885*  (0.249) 3.276*  (0.215) 4.351*  (0.238) 3.674*  (0.139) 
Sam Adams 3.675*  (0.229) 3.620*  (0.245) 4.095*  (0.278) 4.032*  (0.140) 
Oskar Blues 4.437*  (0.348) 3.122*  (0.266) 3.674*  (0.403) 3.159*  (0.136) 
Marshall 4.044*  (0.304) 3.053*  (0.234) 3.851*  (0.300) 3.834*  (0.171) 
     
No. of observations 4376 4472 4728 13576 
No. of respondents 547 559 591 1697 
Log likelihood -4727.9 -5004.5 -5082.9 -14824.6 
a * designates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
b Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 2.2. Embedded trap question random parameter logit results 
  
Correct 
respondents 
Correct or revised 
respondents 
Respondents 
who did not 
revise 
Correctly 
revised 
Incorrectly 
responded 
 Mean of random parameter  
Budweiser 1.253*  (0.322)  1.062*a (0.392) b  1.908*  (0.454) 2.835*  (0.617) 2.335*  (0.378) 
Miller Lite 1.656*  (0.331)  1.336*  (0.336)  1.712*  (0.562) 2.960*  (0.787) 2.223*  (0.436) 
Corona 3.363*  (0.277)  2.759*  (0.345)  2.225*  (0.433) 3.661*  (0.626) 2.702*  (0.376) 
Sam Adams 3.696*  (0.290)  3.990*  (0.311)  1.757*  (0.557) 3.014*  (0.628) 2.271*  (0.373) 
Oskar Blues 0.161    (0.351) -0.118    (0.448) -0.596    (0.647) -0.989  (1.639) -1.014   (0.934) 
Marshall 1.657*  (0.267)  1.286*  (0.317) -0.996    (0.959) 0.525  (0.858) -0.607   (0.751) 
      
 Nonrandom parameter  
Price -0.635*  (0.026) -0.613*  (0.024) -0.348*  (0.049) -0.435*  (0.062) -0.381*  (0.039) 
      
 Standard deviation of random parameter  
Budweiser 5.411*  (0.450) 4.917*  (0.429) 2.570*  (0.493) 2.318*  (0.499) 2.291*  (0.337) 
Miller Lite 3.693*  (0.303) 4.302*  (0.334) 3.164*  (0.514) 3.789*  (0.754) 3.117*  (0.457) 
Corona 3.442*  (0.262) 3.861*  (0.371) 2.195*  (0.374) 2.969*  (0.559) 2.492*  (0.308) 
Sam Adams 4.249*  (0.357) 3.660*  (0.277) 3.025*  (0.544) 2.991*  (0.603) 3.027*  (0.507) 
Oskar Blues 3.365*  (0.301) 3.715*  (0.347) 1.297*  (0.360) 3.712*  (1.118) 3.374*  (0.811) 
Marshall 3.234*  (0.284) 3.168*  (0.256) 3.126*  (0.787) 2.120*  (0.517) 2.960*  (0.530) 
      
No. of observations 3496 3920 552 424 976 
No. of respondents 437 490 69 53 122 
Log likelihood -3784.7 -4274.3 -706.0 -479.6 -1188.5 
a * designates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
b Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 2.3. Long trap question random parameter logit results 
  
Correct 
respondents 
Correct or revised 
respondents 
Respondents 
who did not 
revise 
Correctly 
revised 
Incorrectly 
responded 
 Mean of random parameter  
Budweiser 2.289*  (0.395)  1.692*a (0.398) b  1.812*  (0.464) 1.408*  (0.718)  2.014*  (0.353) 
Miller Lite 1.155*  (0.535)  1.425*  (0.390)  1.652*  (0.419) 1.038*  (0.498)  0.907*  (0.315) 
Corona 4.085*  (0.350)  3.232*  (0.280)  2.135*  (0.469) 1.644*  (0.535)  1.788*  (0.347) 
Sam Adams 4.585*  (0.360)  4.094*  (0.253)  1.509*  (0.552) 2.299*  (0.525)  1.871*  (0.365) 
Oskar Blues 0.793    (0.470) -0.366    (0.551)  0.898*  (0.425) -0.753  (0.707)  0.504    (0.345) 
Marshall 0.785    (0.484)  0.935*  (0.368) -0.419    (0.700) -0.148  (0.677) -0.362    (0.471) 
      
 Nonrandom parameter  
Price -1.055*  (0.038) -0.829*  (0.028) -0.102*  (0.047) -0.324*  (0.043) -0.227*  (0.032) 
      
 Standard deviation of random parameter  
Budweiser 5.859*  (0.442) 5.246*  (0.544) 2.232*  (0.461) 3.145*  (0.586) 2.330*  (0.313) 
Miller Lite 5.565*  (0.485) 4.691*  (0.345) 1.201*  (0.316) 2.948*  (0.508) 2.523*  (0.283) 
Corona 5.323*  (0.387) 4.962*  (0.285) 2.231*  (0.412) 4.282*  (0.636) 3.414*  (0.364) 
Sam Adams 5.560*  (0.423) 4.362*  (0.266) 2.204*  (0.441) 3.310*  (0.581) 2.823*  (0.372) 
Oskar Blues 3.669*  (0.270) 4.417*  (0.479) 0.955*  (0.334) 3.024*  (0.645) 1.746*  (0.326) 
Marshall 5.631*  (0.407) 4.508*  (0.385) 2.692*  (0.726) 2.708*  (0.485) 2.792*  (0.661) 
      
No. of observations 3528 4312 416 784 1200 
No. of respondents 441 539 52 98 150 
Log likelihood -3328.5 -4348.8 -595.7 -928.7 -1549.1 
a * designates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
b Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 2.4. Beer elasticities derived by estimating the percent change in the probability chosen 
given a 1% increase in the price of all the beers 
 
Control Embedded TQ Long TQ 
-0.202% -0.141% -0.268% 
[-0.253, -0.162] [-0.18, -0.109] [-0.321, -0.216] 
 Correct respondents 
 
-0.183% -0.503% 
[-0.236, -0.139] [-0.641, -0.378] 
 Correct or revised respondents 
 -0.182% -0.330% 
 [-0.232, -0.143] [-0.408, -0.252] 
 Respondents who did not revise 
 -0.094% -0.013% 
 [-0.152, -0.057] [-0.031, -0.001] 
Estimates based on random parameter logit model where attentive participants either correctly responded or revised 
the trap question.  Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals as calculated by the method derived by 
Krinsky and Robb (1986). 
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Table 2.5. The probability of not selecting a beer for alternative minium price policies for the attentive participants 
Min. 
Price 
Beers at the 
Minimum Price 
Control Group Embedded TQ Long TQ 
   Correct or Revise No Revision Correct or Revise No Revision 
$3.50 Budweiser,  
Miller Lite 
6.70% 6.49% 6.31% 8.75% 2.96% 
[5.45, 8.22] [5.19, 8.06] [4.21, 9.30] [6.95, 11.15] [1.70, 4.97] 
$4.00 Budweiser,  
Miller Lite 
7.20% 6.91% 6.71% 9.49% 3.01% 
[5.83, 8.82] [5.55, 8.59] [4.45, 9.84] [7.54, 120.1] [1.73, 5.05] 
$4.50 Budweiser,  
Miller Lite 
7.71% 7.34% 7.12% 10.24% 3.07% 
[6.24, 9.42] [5.93, 9.10] [4.76, 10.36] [8.18, 12.90] [1.76, 5.15] 
$5.00 Budweiser,  
Miller Lite,  
Sam Adams, 
Corona 
8.20% 7.75% 7.52% 10.99% 3.12% 
[6.65, 9.99] [6.30, 9.60] [5.03, 10.91] [8.81, 13.75] [1.79, 5.26] 
$5.50 Budweiser,  
Miller Lite,  
Sam Adams, 
Corona,  
Oskar Blues, 
Marshall 
9.88% 9.24% 8.46% 13.29% 3.26% 
[8.07, 11.97] [7.53, 11.32] [5.67, 12.46] [10.82, 16.49] [1.87, 5.50] 
Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals calculated using 1,000 draws from the method derived by Krinsky and Robb (1986). 
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Table 2.6. Increase in the market share for craft beera given alternative minium price policies for the attentive participants 
Min. 
Price 
Beers at the 
Minimum 
Price 
Control 
Group 
Embedded TQ Long TQ 
   Correct or Revise No Revision Correct or Revise No Revision 
$3.50 Budweiser,  
Miller Lite 
13.47% 11.87% 6.53% 12.14% 13.85% 
[8.66, 19.19] [8.46, 15.79] [3.52, 11.28] [8.59, 16.77] [8.89, 19.79] 
$4.00 Budweiser,  
Miller Lite 
14.00% 12.80% 6.81% 12.76% 14.00% 
[9.08, 19.83] [9.20, 17.76] [3.71, 11.70] [9.03, 17.43] [8.98, 20.11] 
$4.50 Budweiser,  
Miller Lite 
14.52% 13.35% 7.12% 13.32% 14.17% 
[9.44, 20.47] [9.62, 18.44] [3.87, 12.09] [9.48, 18.10] [9.18, 20.34] 
$5.00 Budweiser,  
Miller Lite,  
Sam Adams, 
Corona 
15.00% 13.92% 7.40% 13.83% 14.33% 
[9.84, 21.07] [10.12, 19.05] [4.04, 12.50] [9.90, 18.73] [9.31, 20.56] 
$5.50 Budweiser,  
Miller Lite,  
Sam Adams, 
Corona,  
Oskar Blues, 
Marshall 
15.48% 14.31% 7.63% 14.24% 14.53% 
[10.21, 21.65] [10.38, 19.56] [4.20, 12.86] [10.15, 19.20] [9.44, 20.78] 
aCraft beer options in the sample are Sam Adams Boston Lager, Oskar Blues Mama’s Little Yella Pils, and Marshall Old Pavillion Pilsner. 
Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals derived by the method outlined in Krinsky and Robb (1986). 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE APPROACH TO DISTINGUISHING 
PERCEPTIONS FROM PREFERENCES FOR BEER BRANDS 
 
 
The idea that perceptions and beliefs influence choice has been embedded in economic 
models since at least the foundations of expected utility theory if not before (Savage, 
1954; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).  As early as Hayek (1952), the effects of 
“softer” variables such as perceptions have been identified as shaping consumers’ 
choices.  He notes, “Perception is thus always an interpretation, the placing of something 
into one or several classes of objects. [E]ven the so-called elementary sensory qualities 
are in this sense ‘abstractions,’ since they are determined by bundles of relationships 
which we have learnt to attach a certain stimuli which in a physical sense may or may not 
possess identical properties” (Hayek, 1952; pp. 142-143).  Thus, while distorted 
perceptions can have a meaningful impact on choice, they are not synonymous with 
preference (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000).   
Identifying how perceptions and other psychological variables (i.e. beliefs, 
attitudes, and opinions) influence preferences has become especially popular in the 
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economics literature of recent (e.g., Costanigro, Deselnicu, and Kroll, 2015; Johnston et. al, 
2012; Lundhede et al., 2015; Lusk, Tonsor, and Schroeder, 2014), but psychology and 
economics have always been “bound together by perception” (Hoyt, 1965; pp. 106).  Because 
economists have traditionally hypothesized that information and other variables affect choice 
through beliefs or perceptions rather than the preferences directly, there has been a longstanding 
interest in eliciting consumer perceptions.   Alas, perceptions and preferences are likely to be 
endogenously determined.  To date, few reliable options have been proposed to deal with the 
possible endogeneity problem.  Accurately separating perceptions and preferences has significant 
practical implications, as omitting perceptions from models of consumer behavior can alter 
policy recommendations (Daly et al., 2012; Just, 2008; Marette, Roe, and Teisl, 2012; Malone 
and Lusk, 2017a).  There is also value in capturing perceptions separate from preferences, as 
perceptions are posited to be more malleable, making them of additional interest to the 
effectiveness of advertising campaigns that might seek to exogenously shape perceptions. 
The purpose of this study is to describe an instrumental variable method for 
differentiating perceptions from preferences via the control function approach.  In particular, we 
draw insight from the widely cited method of Hausman (1996) that has been used in the 
industrial organization literature (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995; Nevo, 2001).  The 
authors estimate discrete choice demand models, and to address endogeneity of prices in the 
demand equations, they utilized prices for a good in one location as an instrument for prices of a 
good in another location.  The assumption is that there are common cost or supply-side factors 
affecting a brand in all locations, but that these are uncorrelated with preference for a brand in a 
given location.  In our case, we utilize a choice experiment to exogenously vary the prices of 
brands, so price endogeneity is not an issue.  However, we are unable to control individual, 
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brand-specific perceptions about each brand.  Yet, akin to the logic in Hausman (1996), there are 
likely genetic or environmental factors that jointly influence perceptions of multiple brands but 
that are uncorrelated with the preference for a given brand.  If so, perceptions of brand A might 
be used as an instrument for perceptions of brand B and vice versa. 
As such, the primary objective of this article is to investigate the aforementioned 
instrumental variable approach for dealing with the endogeneity bias.  We compare this approach 
to one that uses personality variables, which are generally assumed relatively fixed individual-
specific traits, as instruments.  Our results come from a national survey of 1,697 participants who 
are likely to drink beer in the United States.  Our estimation method relies on the control function 
approach for discrete choice models derived by Petrin and Train (2010), which relies on first 
estimating a series of linear regression models involving the instruments, obtaining the model 
residuals, and incorporating these residuals as explanatory variables in the discrete choice model. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.  In the following section, we 
provide a background of how this article relates to other studies that have incorporated 
perceptions into their models.  We then outline our empirical method and further explain the 
justification for our instruments.  In the data section, we describe the design and implementation 
of a choice experiment conducted to estimate the effect of brand equity perceptions on beer 
preferences.  Beer makes an ideal candidate for this research, as the individual perceptions of 
each specific brand are likely to substantially influence which pint that consumer purchases.  We 
then compare the results from a random parameter logit model that distinguishes perceptions 
from preferences but does not control for endogeneity with a random parameter logit model that 
distinguishes perceptions from preferences but includes our instrumental variables.  The final 
section concludes with limitations and implications for future research. 
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Background 
Choice modeling has become an especially popular tool for estimating consumer preferences, as 
the discrete choice experiment exhibits high levels of external validity (e.g., Chang, Lusk, and 
Norwood. 2009).  Moreover, prior research suggests that stated preferences derived from 
hypothetical choice experiments are largely consistent with preferences inferred from revealed 
preference studies (Hensher, Lourivere, and Swait, 1998; Louviere, Hensher, and Swait, 2000).  
Even when the discrete choices are non-binding, previous research has shown that such 
“hypothetical bias” is often less problematic when estimating marginal changes (Lusk and 
Schoeder, 2004; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001). 
Historically, the discrete choice experiment literature has not differentiated between 
perceptions and preferences (for exceptions, see Adamowicz et al., 1997; Poor et al., 2001; 
Provencher, Lewis, and Anderson, 2012).  Some researchers recommend incorporating factor 
analysis into a “hybrid” choice model where latent variables (or beliefs) are estimated, although 
this method has the potential to generate measurement error (Hensher, Rose, and Greene, 2015).  
Other research has focused on incorporating probabilistic beliefs into their analysis (Lusk, 
Tonsor, and Schroeder, 2014).  For example, Teisl and Roe (2010) developed and applied a 
method to determine willingness-to-pay for new safety-promoting food technologies.  To control 
for the endogeneity between subjective perceptions and consumer preferences, the authors 
provided each participant a randomly selected probability that the products in the choice 
experiment were contaminated.  By subtracting the participant’s stated subjective probability of 
contamination from the randomly assigned exogenous probability, interacting the difference with 
household demographics, and including these values in the model, the authors argue that they 
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successfully control for endogeneity concerns. In short, the exogenous information provided to 
participants acted as their identifying instrument.   
In contrast to Teisl and Roe (2010), the method we propose in this article can be 
identified via simple psychometric, Likert-type scales.  We take two unique approaches for 
identifying potential instruments.  Our first approach borrows from the approach established by 
Hausman (1996), as we posit that one can use perceptions about other brands as instruments in 
explaining perceptions about a given brand.  The assumption is that whatever supply-side factors 
are jointly affecting perceptions of all brands are unrelated to preferences for a given brand.  In 
essence, we are assuming that the residual differences across perceptions of taste and brand 
familiarity capture the unobserved, endogenous heterogeneity likely to confound the causal 
interpretation of our empirical model.  This approach exploits the correlation between 
preferences for a product and their independence from perceptions for different products.  As 
such, we identify our instrumental variable based on a rationale similar to Berry, Levinsohn, and 
Pakes (1995) who used prices of an automobile in one location as instruments for prices in other 
locations.  Rather than focus on differences in regional prices across locations, our first 
instrumental variable approach is based on differences in product perceptions across participants.  
In other words, the intuition is that while perceptions of other products are likely to be correlated 
with perceptions of a particular product, they are unlikely to be correlated with preferences of the 
product in question.  For example, taste perceptions for Miller Lite are likely to be correlated 
with taste perceptions for Budweiser, taste perceptions for Corona, etc.; however taste 
perceptions for Miller Lite are unlikely correlated with the “residual preference” for Budweiser.  
The argument is that there are likely exogenous factors, like genetics, that are likely to influence 
taste perceptions of multiple brands that are uncorrelated with factors, like advertising, which 
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influence preferences for a particular brand.  While the example is particular to our application, 
the idea has broad potential in a wide variety of contexts related to food, transportation, health, 
and environment.  For example, perceptions of the beauty or cleanliness of one state park might 
be used as in instrument for perceived beauty/cleanliness of another state park in a choice model 
explaining recreational location choice. 
To explore the robustness of our results, we also consider a second class of instrumental 
variables for perceptions based on individual-specific personality traits and demographic 
characteristics.  There has been growing interest in the use of personality in economic work, and 
research suggests that personality traits are relatively fixed constructs that are heritable (e.g., 
Almlund et al., 2011).  In addition to questions related to consumer demographics, we include 
scores related to four different personality scales, which were selected as they are likely to be 
causally related to a consumer’s taste perceptions and brand familiarity.  First, we include a scale 
used to capture consumer novelty-seeking (Manning, Bearden, and Madden, 1995), as previous 
research has shown that novelty-seekers tend to perceive beer brands differently than do 
consumers who do not seek our novel products (Malone and Lusk, 2017b).   Although some 
consumers might be highly-selective in their taste perceptions, it is also possible that some 
consumers are not very discriminating in their tastes, and instead simply seek to “satisfice” some 
unspecified lower preference.  In other words, some consumers might have lower a threshold for 
ranking the quality of a product.  We then included a scale commonly used to capture the 
propensity for a consumer to be maximizing or satisficing, as well as a scale that measures how 
likely a participant will be regretful in their purchasing choices (Schwartz et al., 2002).  Finally, 
it is possible that happy people are likely to be more optimistic about their taste perceptions of a 
product with which they are unfamiliar.  As such, we include the Subjective Happiness Scale 
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(Lyubomirsky and Lepper, 1999), which identifies whether participants believe they are more or 
less happy than what they perceive to be average.     
 
Theoretical Framework 
The explanatory power of the discrete choice experiment originates from Lancaster’s (1966) 
observation that a consumer’s utility of a good is comprised of the sum of the utility of the 
characteristics of a good.  Following McFadden (1974), we utilize the random utility model 
(RUM).  In its simplest form, let 𝑈𝑖𝑗 be the utility consumer i experiences from selecting the 
choice alternative j: 
(1)                                               𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛼 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 is the price of choice j, 𝛼 is the marginal (dis)utility of the price, 𝛽𝑗 indicates the 
utility of beer j relative to the “none” option, which is normalized to zero for identification 
purposes, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the unobserved portion of the utility function.  It is possible that probabilistic 
uncertainty can influence a consumer’s utility (Glenk and Colombo, 2011), and other studies 
have identified methods to relax the random utility framework to address this potential issue 
(Lusk, Tonsor, and Schroeder, 2014; Teisl and Roe, 2010).  Specifically, they estimate a model 
consistent with expected utility theory (EUT) where consumer i evaluates the risk associated 
with choice j (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).  Mathematically, expected utility (𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑗) 
can be defined as: 
(2)                                                         𝐸𝑈𝑖𝑗 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘 𝑈𝑖𝑗
𝐾
𝑘=1
 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the probability k of individual i receiving a specific outcome (or attribute) from 
option j.  As explained by Lusk, Schroeder, and Tonsor (2014), these 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘 can be interpreted as 
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subjective, individual-specific beliefs.  This probabilistic approach is somewhat limited for two 
reasons.  First, participants might struggle to quantify their beliefs probabilistically (Manski, 
2004).  Second, while incorporating beliefs into a utility function in the form of a probability can 
help more precisely identify preference parameters, these probabilistic changes can be somewhat 
difficult to interpret. 
Even if consumer i’s probabilistic beliefs are assumed to be known (𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 1), a 
product’s intangible characteristics (i.e. perceptions) likely affect a consumer’s utility.  If left 
unidentified, some of the impact of this unobserved variable is likely to be captured within 
parameter estimates for the observed factors, thereby potentially biasing  𝛽𝑗 in an ambiguous 
direction.  That is, where previous studies have separated probabilistic beliefs from preferences, 
it is also important to distinguish category-specific perceptions from preferences.  As such, we 
define 𝑈𝑖𝑗 as: 
(3)                                𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗 + 𝜏1 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 + 𝜏2 ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
where the alternative-specific constant 𝛽𝑗could be considered the “brand loyalty effect” for 
choice alternative  j, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 is the price of choice alternative  j, which is exogenously determined 
by the experimental design, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 is participant i’s perception of choice alternative  j, 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
is the unobserved random component, and all 𝜏𝑖 are parameters to be estimated.  A key benefit to 
this approach is that it allows us to identify and causally interpret how a product’s perception 
influences consumer decision-making, where 𝜏2 is the estimated preference for the issue in 
question.   
A fundamental concern is that some unobserved factor might simultaneously influence a 
product’s perceptions and preferences, which would cause the error term (𝜀𝑖𝑗) to be correlated 
with 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗.  The endogeneity might be caused by many potential biases.  For one, the 
41 
 
observable price of a product in the discrete choice model might influence the consumer’s taste 
perception, generating the potential for feedback effects.  There might also be concern for 
heterogeneity associated with an omitted parameter, as might be the case of perceptions for bread 
products, where the perceptions of health and safety of a gluten-intolerant consumer are likely to 
be endogenously determined.  There might be potential concern for some measurement error, as 
participants might struggle to identify their perceptions on a Likert scale.  As such, the sign and 
significance of the potential endogeneity are somewhat ambiguous, yet likely to exist in many 
contexts. 
Although many methods have been proposed to deal with endogeneity bias in other 
contexts, the instrumental variable (IV) approach is of the most common in the empirical 
literature.  For an instrument to successfully eliminate the bias in the relevant parameter 
estimates, it should be highly correlated with the variable of interest (i.e. perceptions) while 
being uncorrelated with the residual of the dependent variable.  Valid instruments fit two criteria.   
First, the covariance between the estimated instrument and the perception of interest is non-zero.  
Second, the covariance between the estimated instrument and the error term in the choice model 
is zero.   
Because the discrete choice model is nonlinear, the traditional instrumental variable 
approach would not apply.  Instead, we follow the “control function approach” proposed by 
Petrin and Train (2010) which retains much of the functional form specification, but works 
around the specific distributional assumptions for discrete choice modeling.  As such, a discrete 
choice model that controls for endogeneity can be estimated in two stages.  For the first stage, we 
estimate a series of regressions and obtain their residuals.  In our first approach, we estimate 
OLS regressions for each choice option j, where each consumer i’s perception of option j is the 
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dependent variable and each consumer i’s perception of all of the other options (k, g, l…) are the 
explanatory variables.  Mathematically, in the first stage, regressions for perception for all 
products J are estimated such that: 
(5)             𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑘, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑔, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛 … ) +  𝜇𝑖𝑗,      
where product perception j is a function of all other product perceptions in the discrete choice 
model, and 𝜇𝑖𝑗 is the normally distributed error term for each regression.  For our second 
approach, we estimate OLS regressions where each consumer i’s perception of option j is the 
dependent variable and each consumer i’s personality and demographic values are the 
explanatory variables.  Based on these “first stage” regressions, we obtain the estimated residuals 
for each perception and option (?̂?𝑖𝑗).  Assuming the derived instrument is uncorrelated with the 
brand preferences, including the residual as an explanatory variable in the second stage of the 
estimation can effectively test and control for endogeneity between perceptions and preferences.  
Thus, by including the residual ?̂?𝑖𝑗 for consumer i’s perception of product j in a utility function 
updated from equation (3), we can successfully derive separate parameter estimates for the 
alternative-specific constants and the product perceptions.  Mathematically, the updated utility 
function to be estimated can be defined as: 
(6)                          𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗 + 𝜏1 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 + 𝜏2 ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 + λ ∙ ?̂?𝑖𝑗 +  𝑤𝑖𝑗, 
where the linear control function is comprised of a vector of parameters (λ) associated with the 
vector of residuals (?̂?𝑖𝑗) associated with each of the perceptions derived from equation (4), 
and 𝑤𝑖𝑗 is an iid Type I extreme value error term.  The parameters 𝛽𝑗 and 𝜏𝑖 in equation (6) can 
be interpreted in the same manner as in equation (3), although, depending on the significance of 
the endogeneity bias, the parameter estimates might vary substantially. 
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Data and Methods 
We utilize a simple “branded” discrete choice experiment where individuals choose between six 
different pints of beers at varying prices.  Our chosen study product category is lager beer, as 
brand-level perceptions are likely to influence beer-buying decisions.  Blind taste tests indicate 
that consumers often cannot differentiate between two competing products, suggesting that 
perceptions of brand equity are an important influencer of consumer choice and perceived 
quality (Alison and Uhl, 1964; Almenberg, Dreber, and Goldstein, 2016).  As such, perceptions 
and preferences are likely to be especially difficult to disentangle for this product.  An additional 
benefit to using pints of beer is that beer allows us to keep prices below $10, which reduces the 
potential for hypothetical bias to invalidate the study findings (Murphy et al., 2005). 
Data were collected in May 2015, and participants were recruited via an online panel 
maintained by the company SSI®, who maintains its panel of participants through a variety of 
means including phone calls and online ads, and offers their panel participants approximately 
$1.50 in gift cards for each completed survey.  A total of 1,697 surveys were collected, 
generating a total of 1,697 x 8 = 13,576 choice observations.  Table 1 shows the demographics of 
our sample, which are consistent with the characteristics of U.S. residents over 21 who might 
drink beer.  Men made up 54.15% of our sample, 32.76% of the participants were under 35 years 
of age, and 45.67% of the median household income for the 1,697 participants earned less than 
$60,000.   
A main effects orthogonal fractional factorial design was employed to assign prices to 
brands; the final design consisted of eight choice questions in which the price of each beer was 
uncorrelated with the price of other beers.  Each participant answered eight choice questions 
(Figure 1), with the following instructions: “We are interested in the types of beer you like to 
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buy.  Imagine you’re at a bar or restaurant.  In what follows, we will ask you 8 different choice 
questions, and in each question we would like to know which type of beer you most prefer when 
you buy a pint of beer.”  Respondents chose between six randomly ordered beers at price 
combinations of $3 and $6, or respondents could choose “none”.    
After the choice experiment questions, we then used a Likert-type scale to identify 
participants’ perceptions of two components of brand equity: perceived taste and brand 
familiarity.  These two variables were chosen as new brewers are likely to be interested in how to 
most efficiently invest their advertising capital: by promoting the high-quality taste of their beers 
to a subset of the population, or by aggressively advertising to many people in an effort to 
promote brand awareness.  As such, we asked participants to rate their familiarity with each of 
the aforementioned six brands on a three point scale (1=low, 2=medium, and 3=high).  Then we 
asked respondents to rate their perceived taste of each brand on a five-point scale that spanned 
between 1=“one of the worst tasting” and 5=“one of the best tasting.”  Mathematically, we can 
define the indirect utility associated with participant i’s choice of beer brand j as: 
(7)     𝑉𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗 + 𝜏1 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗 + 𝜏2 ∙ 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 + λ1 ∙ ?̂?1𝑖𝑗 +  𝜏3 ∙ 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗 + λ2 ∙ ?̂?2𝑖𝑗, 
where the estimated control function instruments λ1 and λ2 are associated with residuals ?̂?1𝑖𝑗 and 
?̂?2𝑖𝑗, which are associated with the perceptions 𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗 and 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗, and all 𝛽𝑗 and 𝜏𝑖 are 
parameters to be estimated. 
Table 2 describes product-specific characteristics as well as the average taste perception 
(𝑇𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗) and brand familiarity (𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗) values of the beers in our sample.  In an effort 
to focus on brand-specific perceptions, all beers in the sample are lagers.  Alcohol percentages 
ranged from Miller Lite, which only contains 4.17% alcohol by volume (ABV), to 5.30% ABV 
(Oskar Blues Mama’s Little Yella Pils).  Beer Advocate rates the Samuel Adams Boston Lager 
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the highest-quality option in our sample (86), while Corona and Miller Lite were the rated as the 
lowest quality options (55).  Note that the data shown in table 2 on origin, ABV, and beer 
advocate ratings were not shown to participants and is shown here for informational purposes 
only.  On average, Mama’s Little Yella Pils from Oskar Blues Brewery was perceived to be the 
worst tasting of the six options, while the Sam Adams Boston Lager was perceived to be the best 
tasting.  As one might expect, participants were most familiar with Budweiser, but were least 
familiar with Oskar Blues and Marshall.  Consumer perceptions were heterogeneous, and some 
participants perceived the taste of the lesser-known beers as above average tasting even when 
they were unfamiliar with the beer.   
 
Results 
For our first approach to controlling for potential endogeneity, the first step consisted of 12 OLS 
regressions (two perceptions (taste and familiarity) and six brands) using other products’ 
perceptions as instruments.  Tables showing the 12 regression results can be found in the 
Appendix.  When we regress brand familiarities on other brand familiarities, the majority of 
parameter estimates are significant at the α = 0.05 level, and R-squared values range from 0.18 to 
0.49, indicating that there is a significant correlation between familiarities for each brand.  Most 
of these signs are positive, although there is a negative, statistically significant correlation 
between familiarity of the Budweiser and Oskar Blues brands.  For the taste familiarity 
instrument, all significant parameters are positive.  Similar to the results for the brand familiarity 
instrument, the R-squared values are sizable (given cross-sectional data), ranging from 0.16 to 
0.48. 
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 Our second approach to controlling for potential endogeneity involved 12 OLS 
regressions using individual-specific personality and demographics included as instruments.  
Tables that describe these regressions can also be found in the Appendix.  These instruments did 
not exhibit as much explanatory power as did the models estimated for the first approach, 
although approximately half of all parameter estimates were statistically significant at the α = 
0.05 level.  For the models of brand familiarity, R-squared values ranged from 0.02 for 
Budweiser to 0.26 for Oskar Blues and Marshall.  When we regress individual-specific 
personality and demographic characteristics to predict taste perceptions, we again identified 
approximately half of all parameter estimates as statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level.  R-
squared values ranged from 0.06 (Corona) to 0.12 (Oskar Blues and Marshall). 
 As described, we saved the residuals from these regressions and incorporated them into 
our random parameter logit (RPL) models.  Table 3 displays the parameter estimates from the 
two different instrumental variable specifications, as well as for a model that does not control for 
the endogeneity (recall the brand effects are estimated relative to the “none” option, the utility of 
which was normalized to zero for identification).  The AIC for both the random parameter 
models that include instruments is lowest, indicating that the original model specification was 
most likely endogenous.    
The AIC for the model that includes instruments based on other products’ perceptions 
data is lowest overall, suggesting that those instruments fit the data better than the other 
instruments.  Moreover, in the model specification that uses the control function approach with 
perceptions data, the parameter estimates associated with the residuals for both taste and 
familiarity are statistically significant, indicating the presence of endogeneity.  When we do not 
correct for endogeneity, the random parameter logit model indicates that, on average, the 
47 
 
parameter for perceived taste is approximately twice as large as brand familiarity.  When we 
control for endogeneity, however, the parameter estimate for perceived taste becomes 
approximately seven times larger for the average participant.  Because of the size of the standard 
deviation of brand familiarity relative to the parameter mean, this model indicates that an 
increase in familiarity does not increase the likelihood a beer is selected for all consumers.  In 
fact, results suggest that approximately 30.85% of participants are actually more likely to 
purchase unfamiliar beer, rather than the option with which they are most familiar. 
 
Brand Familiarity and Perceived Taste Elasticities 
As noted, results from hypothetical choice experiments are most useful when discussing 
marginal changes (Lusk and Schroeder, 2004).  As such, we focus on the marginal effects and 
elasticities associated with changes in each perception.  We use the model estimated where the 
instruments were derived from the perceptions themselves as this model best fit the data.  Table 
4 displays the elasticities for brand familiarity for both models reported in table 5 and reports the 
difference between elasticity estimates from the control function and the traditional approaches.  
The table suggests brand familiarity affects each beer differently.  For example, the preferred 
model indicates that a one percent improvement in the brand familiarity of Miller Lite leads to a 
0.603% increase in the probability the beer is chosen.  By contrast, a one percent increase in the 
brand familiarity of the Marshall option would only lead to a 0.187% increase in the probability 
the beer is chosen.  If we do not correct for endogeneity, the estimated elasticities are roughly 
twice as large – the own-familiarity elasticity for Miller Lite is now 1.208 and the own-
familiarity elasticity for Marshall is now 0.597.   
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Perceived taste elasticities demonstrate the opposite pattern, which can be found in table 
5.  Changes in perceived taste matter much more for the craft options (Marshall and Oskar 
Blues) than do changes in the perceived taste of the premium and macro options.  For example, a 
one percent increase in the perceived taste of the Oskar Blues option leads to a 6.375% increase 
in the quantity demanded of that beer, while the same increase in the perceived taste of Corona 
leads to a 4.261% increase in its quantity demanded.  Similar to the own-taste elasticities, 
relative to the familiarity elasticities, cross-taste elasticities are much larger.  According to the 
model estimated via the control function approach, the perceived taste of Sam Adams is the 
option most dependent on the perceived taste of the other beers.  Specifically, the one percent 
increase in Corona’s perceived taste would also lead to a 1.520% reduction in the probability a 
Sam Adams was selected, and the one percent increase in Oskar Blues’ perceived taste would 
create a corresponding 1.991% reduction in Sam Adams’ quantity demanded.  Elasticity 
estimates from the traditional approach are all closer to zero, and own-taste elasticities are 
approximately 1.5% larger for all beer options, with the largest differences being for the Oskar 
Blues and Marshall beers.  Even without correcting for endogeneity, perceived taste is more 
important for the small craft breweries than for the larger breweries. 
 
Discussion 
A key contribution from the behavioral sciences to economics has been that perception 
malleability can influence individual decision-making and preference formation.  In this article, 
we used a discrete choice experiment for beer to show that perceptions of taste and familiarity 
substantially affect consumer choice.  We also show that, although perceptions and preferences 
are endogenous, the endogeneity bias can be corrected by utilizing perceptions of other 
49 
 
alternatives as instruments for perceptions of the alternative in question.  Once we control for 
endogeneity, our estimates indicate that some participants actually prefer an unfamiliar beer (i.e., 
they are variety-seekers), and that taste is even more influential than what the endogenous model 
indicated.  We also find that perceptions of taste are more important for the smaller craft 
breweries than they are for larger breweries. 
Although this study makes an important contribution in distinguishing brand perceptions 
from preferences, some shortcomings remain.  First, because we studied beer, there is potential 
that consumers in this market might be using price as a proxy for quality.  This phenomenon has 
been documented in the literature surrounding wine (see Goldstein et al., 2008), and, although 
we have tried to avoid this problem by using an experimental design where prices are 
uncorrelated with brands, it is likely to exist in other markets for experience goods.  Furthermore, 
this choice experiment focused on beer brands as these brands are largely created to influence 
consumer perceptions.  As observed in Malone and Lusk (2017a) who conducted a discrete 
choice experiment for meat products, consumer choices regarding other goods with weaker 
brand equity might respond differently to perceptions, making this instrumental variable 
approach less necessary.  Finally, these results have somewhat ambiguous implications for beer 
promotion, given that we do not know how much it would cost for each brewer to change 
consumer perceptions.   
 While the empirical application of this article focused on perceptions of brand equity for 
beer, the method can be applied to many other utility-maximizing choices.  Just as price 
elasticities are important for private and public policy decisions, perception elasticities might 
help identify which perceptions most influence consumer decision-making.  As such, any 
product or public policy that relies on marketing and advertising to alter perceptions in a manner 
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that might shape preferences could benefit from this approach.  Moving forward, future research 
might identify how the provision of information might influence consumer perceptions 
(Costanigro, Deselnicu, and Kroll, 2015).  Similarly, perceptions might become more tightly 
correlated with preferences as consumers gain experience with the product in question.  Future 
studies might test this hypothesis by utilizing a dynamic experiment with repeated observation 
choices and perceptions.  Finally, this study focused on perceptions of brand equity.  For some 
products, perceptions might be more relevant at the characteristic level rather than the 
brand/product level.  Future studies might develop an empirical method for separating these 
perceptions from product attributes.  These shortcomings notwithstanding, this article outlines an 
easy-to-implement method that successfully controls for endogeneity bias in discrete choice 
experiments that attempt to separate perceptions from preferences. 
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Table 3.1. Average perception ratings for each beer brand 
  Perceived Taste a Brand Familiarity b 
Miller Lite 3.000   (1.201) c 2.434   (0.697) 
Corona 3.544   (1.113) 2.535   (0.652) 
Sam Adams 
3.687   (1.057) 2.399   (0.698) 
Budweiser 3.198   (1.239) 2.570   (0.636) 
Oskar Blues 
2.921   (0.893) 1.342   (0.607) 
Marshall 3.036   (0.917) 1.354   (0.613) 
 
a Perceived tasted perceptions evaluated on a 5 point scale (1 = one of the worst tasting, 5 = one of the best tasting 
b Brand familiarity evaluated on a 3 point scale (3 = high familiarity, 1 = low familiarity) 
c Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations 
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Table 3.2.  First stage model estimates for the brand familiarity instruments 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Brand Familiarity Dependent Variable 
Miller Lite Corona Samuel Adams Budweiser Oskar Blues Marshall 
Intercept  0.594*a (0.080)b 0.874*  (0.076) 0.898*  (0.085) 1.045*  (0.068)  0.437*  (0.060)  0.306*  (0.061) 
Miller Lite  0.119*  (0.023) 0.115*  (0.026) 0.405*  (0.019)  0.016    (0.018) -0.020    (0.018) 
Corona  0.126*  (0.025)  0.348*  (0.026) 0.214*  (0.022)  0.018    (0.019)  0.010    (0.019) 
Samuel Adams  0.097*  (0.022) 0.277*  (0.021)  0.039    (0.020)  0.027    (0.017)  0.041*  (0.017) 
Budweiser  0.504*  (0.024) 0.252*  (0.026) 0.058    (0.030)  -0.065*  (0.020)  0.015    (0.021) 
Oskar Blues  0.029    (0.033) 0.031    (0.032) 0.058    (0.035) -0.093*  (0.029)   0.697*  (0.018) 
Marshall -0.035    (0.032) 0.016    (0.031) 0.085*  (0.035)  0.021    (0.029)  0.680*  (0.017)  
       
R-squared  0.305 0.253 0.183  0.331  0.486  0.485 
 
Estimated from N=1,697 observations 
aAn asterisk indicates that the parameter is significant at the 95% level. 
bStandard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.3.  First stage model estimates for the perceived taste instruments 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Perceived Taste Dependent Variable 
Miller Lite Corona Samuel Adams Budweiser Oskar Blues Marshall 
Intercept 0.768*a (0.129)b 1.580*  (0.125) 1.892*  (0.115) 1.197*  (0.132) 0.470*  (0.081) 0.708*  (0.083) 
Miller Lite  0.167*  (0.024) -0.032    (0.023) 0.475*  (0.022) 0.046*  (0.015) 0.004    (0.016) 
Corona 0.164*  (0.024)  0.159*  (0.023) 0.171*  (0.025) 0.038*  (0.015) 0.002    (0.016) 
Samuel Adams -0.035   (0.026) 0.177*  (0.025)  0.014   (0.027) 0.082*  (0.016) 0.114*  (0.016) 
Budweiser 0.441*  (0.021) 0.161*  (0.023) 0.012    (0.022)  -0.001    (0.015) -0.009    (0.015) 
Oskar Blues 0.116*  (0.038) 0.096*  (0.039) 0.186*  (0.036) -0.003   (0.040)  0.656*   (0.019) 
Marshall 0.010   (0.037) 0.006    (0.038) 0.246*  (0.035) -0.024   (0.039) 0.620*  (0.018)  
       
R-Squared   0.285  0.155  0.160    0.276  0.483  0.481 
 
Estimated from N=1,697 observations 
aAn asterisk indicates that the parameter is significant at the 95% level. 
bStandard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.4. Coefficients from the second stage of the control function approach derived by 
obtaining the residuals from tables 3.2 and 3.3 
Residual Familiarity Perceived Taste 
Miller Lite 0.591*a  (0.080) b -0.527*  (0.050) 
Corona 0.909*   (0.071) -0.640*  (0.050) 
Samuel Adams 0.694*   (0.068) -0.453*  (0.049) 
Budweiser 0.465*   (0.079) -0.475*  (0.049) 
Oskar Blues 0.700*   (0.086) -0.739*  (0.075) 
Marshall 0.225*   (0.079) -0.515*  (0.059) 
 
Estimated from N=1,697 observations 
aAn asterisk indicates that the parameter is significant at the 95% level. 
bStandard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.5. Random parameter logit model estimates for models that distinguish between 
perceptions and preferences 
Variable 
Model with 
perceptions 
that does not 
correct for 
endogeneity 
Model with 
perceptions 
that corrects 
for 
endogeneity (1) 
Model with 
perceptions that 
corrects for 
endogeneity (2) 
 Non-Random Parameters 
Price -0.613*a (0.013)b -0.626*  (0.013) -0.615*  (0.013) 
Residual Taste  -0.612*  (0.096) -1.033*  (0.098) 
Residual Familiarity   1.105*  (0.130)  0.710*  (0.125) 
Perceived Taste     2.707*  (0.098)  
Brand Familiarity   0.230   (0.121)  
 Random Parameters 
Perceived Taste   2.250*  (0.059)   3.286*  (0.119) 
Brand Familiarity 1.054*  (0.072)   0.469*  (0.127) 
Miller Lite -4.701*  (0.261) -7.420*  (0.383) -6.527*  (0.406) 
Corona -4.359*  (0.255) -7.022*  (0.408) -6.610*  (0.439) 
Samuel Adams -4.338*  (0.253) -7.229*  (0.413) -6.907*  (0.450) 
Budweiser -4.840*  (0.265) -7.492*  (0.402) -6.826*  (0.427) 
Oskar Blues -4.827*  (0.244) -8.075*  (0.340) -7.061*  (0.368) 
Marshall -4.454*  (0.250) -7.768*  (0.346) -6.851*  (0.379) 
 Distributions of Standard Deviations 
Brand Familiarity 0.966*  (0.053)  0.940*  (0.053) 
Perceived Taste   1.230*  (0.095)  1.178*  (0.096) 
Miller Lite 1.878*  (0.102) 2.583*  (0.120) 1.896*  (0.103) 
Corona 1.654*  (0.099) 2.405*  (0.091) 1.619*  (0.093) 
Samuel Adams 1.622*  (0.101) 2.349*  (0.090) 1.734*  (0.093) 
Budweiser 1.837*  (0.111) 2.638*  (0.120) 1.867*  (0.105) 
Oskar Blues 1.827*  (0.126) 2.388*  (0.132) 1.689*  (0.150) 
Marshall 2.119*  (0.129) 2.817*  (0.119) 2.066*  (0.126) 
    
Number of 
parameters 
17 15 19 
Log likelihood -12,688.3 -13,037.2 -12,596.4 
AIC  25,410.6  26,104.4  25,230.8 
 
aAn asterisk indicates the parameter is significant at the 99% level. 
bStandard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3.6.  Brand familiarity elasticity differences estimated using the control function 
approach and the traditional approach 
Control function approach 
  
Miller 
Lite Corona 
Sam 
Adams Budweiser 
Oskar 
Blues Marshall 
Miller 
Lite 0.603 -0.114 -0.074 -0.165 -0.052 -0.051 
Corona -0.204 0.503 -0.187 -0.212 -0.089 -0.078 
Sam 
Adams -0.151 -0.213 0.371 -0.157 -0.097 -0.090 
Budweiser -0.200 -0.144 -0.094 0.583 -0.054 -0.056 
Oskar 
Blues -0.019 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 0.238 -0.016 
Marshall -0.029 -0.024 -0.024 -0.026 -0.026 0.187 
       
Traditional approach 
Miller 
Lite 1.208 -0.203 -0.152 -0.272 -0.144 -0.129 
Corona -0.370 1.013 -0.346 -0.381 -0.250 -0.216 
Sam 
Adams -0.309 -0.388 0.823 -0.316 -0.286 -0.260 
Budweiser -0.332 -0.258 -0.191 1.169 -0.154 -0.150 
Oskar 
Blues -0.044 -0.040 -0.040 -0.037 0.742 -0.068 
Marshall -0.063 -0.054 -0.058 -0.059 -0.114 0.597 
       
Difference (Control function minus Traditional) 
Miller 
Lite -0.605 0.089 0.078 0.107 0.092 0.078 
Corona 0.166 -0.510 0.159 0.169 0.161 0.138 
Sam 
Adams 0.158 0.175 -0.452 0.159 0.189 0.170 
Budweiser 0.132 0.114 0.097 -0.586 0.100 0.094 
Oskar 
Blues 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.021 -0.504 0.052 
Marshall 0.034 0.030 0.034 0.033 0.088 -0.410 
 
Elasticities derived in NLOGIT using probability weights, and reported with respect to change of X in row 
choice on the probability of the column choice. 
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Table 3.7. Perceived taste elasticity differences estimates using the control function 
approach and the traditional approach 
Control function approach 
  
Miller 
Lite Corona 
Sam 
Adams Budweiser 
Oskar 
Blues Marshall 
Miller 
Lite 4.620 -0.738 -0.454 -1.071 -0.711 -0.601 
Corona -1.414 4.261 -1.252 -1.435 -1.376 -1.158 
Sam 
Adams -1.060 -1.520 3.725 -1.107 -1.991 -1.775 
Budweiser -1.331 -0.930 -0.601 4.502 -0.729 -0.670 
Oskar 
Blues -0.277 -0.279 -0.335 -0.225 6.375 -0.753 
Marshall -0.407 -0.408 -0.524 -0.361 -1.341 5.209 
       
Traditional approach 
Miller 
Lite 3.118 -0.489 -0.355 -0.642 -0.524 -0.440 
Corona -0.947 2.883 -0.894 -0.969 -0.984 -0.838 
Sam 
Adams -0.826 -1.074 2.627 -0.848 -1.337 -1.199 
Budweiser -0.804 -0.624 -0.463 3.059 -0.554 -0.517 
Oskar 
Blues -0.201 -0.195 -0.223 -0.168 4.295 -0.459 
Marshall -0.287 -0.283 -0.342 -0.268 -0.796 3.573 
       
Difference (Control function minus Traditional) 
Miller 
Lite 1.502 -0.249 -0.099 -0.429 -0.187 -0.161 
Corona -0.467 1.378 -0.358 -0.466 -0.392 -0.320 
Sam 
Adams -0.234 -0.446 1.098 -0.259 -0.654 -0.576 
Budweiser -0.527 -0.306 -0.138 1.443 -0.175 -0.153 
Oskar 
Blues -0.076 -0.084 -0.112 -0.057 2.080 -0.294 
Marshall -0.120 -0.125 -0.182 -0.093 -0.545 1.636 
 
Elasticities derived in NLOGIT using probability weights, and reported with respect to change of X in row 
choice on the probability of the column choice. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE EXCESSIVE CHOICE EFFECT MEETS THE MARKET: A FIELD 
EXPERIMENT ON CRAFT BEER CHOICE 
 
 
Whether people have too many choices has long been a topic of debate.  Even in the first 
century, Seneca, the Roman philosopher, famously proclaimed in his Letters from a Stoic 
(1969), “Distringit librorum multitudo!”  His charge that “the abundance of books is 
distraction” predates the modern psychological theory of an excessive choice effect 
(ECE).  Popular books such as The Paradox of Choice (Schwartz, 2004a) posit that 
increasing the number of choice options in the marketplace increases levels of regret and 
decreases levels of satisfaction.  “Information overload” can reduce the probability of 
making a choice, which challenges the standard economic conjecture that more choice 
options cannot decrease consumer utility.  Confronted with a large number of choices, 
consumers might elect to walk away from the transaction altogether.   Excessive choice 
can also overwhelm consumers, causing them to make decisions via sub-optimal  
heuristics.  For example, if confronted with many unfamiliar options, a consumer may 
simply choose the first option listed or select the status quo. 
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Some authors suggest that exogenous constraints on the number of options might 
actually be desirable.  For example, Schwartz advises readers to “learn to love 
constraints.”  He argues: “We would be better off if we embraced certain voluntary 
constraints on our freedom of choice, instead of rebelling against them” (Schwartz, 
2004a; pg. 5).  Alternatively, some researchers have suggested interventions as a way to 
help consumers make better choices through behavioral “nudges” (Johnson et al. 2012).  
These nudges recommend reframing the choice architecture to increase the likelihood of 
selecting a particular option without imposing actual constraints on the available number 
of options.  Altering the choice architecture has been shown to influence consumer choice 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004).  Yet, a deeper question 
permeates much of the discussion on the topic – who should be the one to redesign choice 
architecture?  Should governments and experts reframe choices, or do private nudges 
emerge from market outcomes?  
In a competitive market, the choice architecture is endogenous, and sellers 
compete to provide environments that consumers find appealing, thereby increasing 
profits. In such cases, the market, at least partially, provides incentives to ameliorate the 
ECE by, for example, reducing search costs for consumers (e.g., see Kamenica, 2008; 
Kuksov and Villas-Boas, 2010; Norwood, 2006).  This raises the possibility that ECE 
may arise in laboratory contexts or one-shot field experiments while at the same time 
having limited relevance in day-to-day business decisions.  Whereas prior research 
mainly focus on the identification of an ECE, we show that sellers have access to market-
specific mechanisms (or informational nudges) that narrow its influence.  We 
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demonstrate that if the ECE exists, sellers can mitigate or exasperate its negative effects 
through targeted interventions. 
That search costs affect consumers’ decisions and market outcomes has been 
confirmed in many empirical studies (Besedeš et al., 2012; Besedeš et al., 2015; Gabaix 
et al., 2006; Reutskaja et al., 2011).  For example, Caplin et al. (2011) show that 
laboratory participants search through choices in a sequential manner before they choose 
an option they perceive “good enough” rather than utility maximizing.  Caplin et al. 
(2011) show that choice and search behavior depend on decision contexts such as, for 
example, time constraints.  These experimental insights suggest sellers might be able to 
alleviate the ECE by lowering search costs.  If consumers suffer from an ECE, they (or 
the businesses selling to them) might solve the issue through adopting various 
mechanisms that help consumers navigate through large choice sets.  The evolution of 
these “informational nudges” might explain some of the diversity within the experimental 
results on choice overload.  Many choices might be desirable in some settings or in the 
right context but not in others.  Additionally, empirical research by Schwartz et al. (2002) 
and conceptual models like that of Irons and Hepburn (2007) indicate that the ECE is 
likely to vary across people according to preferences for variety and propensity to 
experience regret.  This suggests the presence or absence of an ECE may depend on a 
firm’s clientele and target market. 
Conceptual models introduced by Kamenica (2008), Kuksov and Villas-Boas 
(2010), and Norwood (2006) suggest that the ECE may not, in fact, be at odds with 
economic theory if consumers face search costs and are uncertain about the value of the 
good.  Selecting which option is most desirable takes time and cognitive resources.  If 
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consumers are presented with a large assortment of unfamiliar items, it can be perfectly 
rational for a consumer to forego the opportunity to buy rather than trying to figure out 
where each product fits in one’s preference ordering.  Such findings suggest differences 
in search costs and inability to understand contextual clues may be factors responsible for 
the heterogeneity in the ECE. 
We test two different informational nudges that sellers might use to potentially 
influence search costs and thereby alter the size of the ECE in the context of consumers’ 
choices in a market where the number of new options is burgeoning: craft beer.  These 
nudges are: 1) the listing of a “special” on the menu and 2) the provision of Beer 
Advocate scores on the menu. We hypothesize that listing a weekly special will increase 
the chances a consumer will select a beer in small choice sets, but that it will have 
negligible effects on the ECE.  “Specials” might imply to consumers that they are not 
only receiving the utility of the item, but are also earning a level of utility associated with 
the transaction (Thaler, 1985).  At first glance, that transaction utility, along with making 
one of the options more cognitively available, should decrease the ECE.  However, 
without any context given as to why the product is “special,” this treatment may not 
actually convey information on relative quality rankings of options.  
This chapter uses these insights as a springboard for studying the ECE in a market 
where there is a proliferation of new options, many of which are likely unfamiliar to 
some consumers: craft beer.  The craft beer market was chosen because it is one in which 
an ECE is likely to exist.  The number of these “small, independent and traditional” 
breweries has increased from two in 1977 to over 2,000 in 2012 (Elzinga et al., 2015).  
This increase in the number of new brands with limited advertising budgets suggests that 
62 
 
most consumers are likely to be unfamiliar with the new options, resulting in no clearly 
dominant option (Dhar, 1997; Dhar and Nowlis, 1999).  Moreover, beer is an experience 
good in that its quality is difficult to observe before consumption, increasing the cost of 
search.  Craft beer has evolved as a novelty-driven market (Watson, 2016).  It is not 
uncommon for a small brewery to offer a dozen different beer styles over the course of a 
year, and many have gained global notoriety in their aggressive desire for novelty.  As an 
example, Delaware’s Dogfish Head Brewing Company flaunts the mantra, “Off-centered 
ales for off-centered people.”  By extension, some restaurants and bars advertise the 
plethora of craft beers they offer on tap.  It follows that a bar selling a high volume of 
craft beer will likely market to a specific demographic of people who are interested in 
novelty. 
We hypothesize that quality scores from a third party scorer will have varying 
effects on the presence of an ECE.  In many markets, professional and crowd-sourced 
ratings appear to assist individuals in the aggregation of information to make a more 
informed decision (Chen et al., 2012).  Specific to this market, multiple ratings websites 
such as Beer Advocate make information freely available to the consumer.  This 
company publishes scores on a 100-point scale for millions of beers based on ratings 
posted by both users and experts.   A seller might list these scores to provide context 
clues and relevant information to a buyer so he can better identify which product might 
be the utility-maximizing choice (Kamenica, 2008).  These scores might be helpful for a 
person who generally knows beer varieties and, for example, self-selects into drinking at 
a bar with many options.  However, a person unfamiliar with beer varieties might find 
that scores will simply add more confusion to an already cognitively taxing menu. 
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The overall objective of this chapter is to empirically explore how the ECE varies 
with informational nudges, relying on economic models suggesting that search costs are a 
likely culprit explaining the phenomenon.  The specific objectives of the current study are 
(1) to determine, in our particular context, whether the ECE exists and (2) whether the 
marketplace mitigates this problem through certain informational nudges.  The next 
section provides more background on the ECE and outlines our particular contribution to 
that literature.  We then introduce and discuss the results of a field experiment conducted 
at a wine bar whose patrons are likely to experience the ECE.  Using this experimental 
data, we estimate the likelihood of selecting a beer while varying the number of options 
present from six choices to 12 in the presence of informational nudges likely to lower 
search costs.  The final section concludes.   
 
Background 
The ECE has been documented as an increase in consumers’ unwillingness to participate 
in a market transaction and as a decrease in well-being as the number of options grows 
(Schwartz, 2002; 2004b).  The phenomenon tends to exist in markets with an unusually 
large number of options when consumers do not have clearly defined preferences and no 
clearly dominant choice exists (Scheibehenne et al., 2010).  Iyengar and Lepper (2000), 
for example, offered varying types of jams for purchase.  Over the course of the study, 
the experimenters changed the number of options available from six to 24 or 30 choices.  
They found consumers were less likely to purchase jam from larger choice sets.  
Schwartz (2002) and others have taken these findings as suggesting that policies which 
restrict choice might improve welfare.  However, to the extent that more choice lowers 
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the likelihood of purchase, it seems that businesses have a profit incentive to refrain from 
offering so many options or to alter the choice environment (Sela et al, 2009). 
The results from studies that have tried to replicate the ECE in other contexts have 
proven inconclusive.  Scheibehenne (2008) attempted to replicate the results found by 
Iyengar and Lepper (2000), but could find no ECE.  Arunachalam et al. (2009) sought to 
determine whether participants would voluntarily reduce their choice set size, and found 
that only a small proportion of respondents would in fact prefer to choose from a smaller 
number of options.  They found that while an ECE can exist for certain types of people, 
the size of the effect was small and difficult to detect, although the maximizer-satisficer 
scale introduced by Schwartz et al., (2002) was predictive of an ECE. 
Because the effect varies from study-to-study, one might wonder whether there 
are systematic differences in the markets, goods, or consumers that give rise to the 
heterogeneity in the measured effects.  Scheibehenne et al. (2010) conducted a meta-
analysis of 50 studies, and determined that while there is a negligible ECE overall, the 
variability in studies is large.  They found that effect sizes were not a function of whether 
the study was hypothetical or non-hypothetical.  They were also unable to identify 
differences across international locations or culture.  Their analysis also revealed a 
publication bias; published studies are more likely to find a statistically significant ECE 
than unpublished studies.  They also found that studies which utilized goods for which 
consumers likely had less knowledge and weak prior preferences were associated with 
larger ECEs. 
Social scientists have excessively studied the ECE, yet none has been able to 
definitively identify what causes the phenomenon, or whether it exists at all.  Seminal 
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articles by Stigler (1961), Coase (1960), and Williamson (1979) suggest that transactions 
costs, often associated with the cost of search, can lead to inefficiencies. Stigler (1961) 
noted that sellers can reduce search costs by, for example, identifying a few goods out of 
many to present to consumers.  Sellers might also lower search costs by providing buyers 
with relevant information through advertising (Nelson, 1974; Chen et al., 2012).  Several 
authors have proposed thoeretical models based on these concepts to reconcile the finding 
of an ECE with economic theory.  Norwood (2006) treated the excessive choice problem 
as one of search costs in the presence of uncertainty about the quality of competing 
goods.  When the number of options are exogenously chosen, a greater variety might 
increase the probability a consumer finds a more preferred option, but it could also create 
less efficient, less successful searches.  His model highlighted the seller’s role as a 
minimizer of search costs for the buyer.  Kamenica’s (2008) model focused on the role of 
the decision-making context as a provider of information in explaining the ECE.  
Different sized choice sets can provide different information (via the so-called 
compromise effect) about which varieties most likely suit consumers’ tastes, resulting in 
an ECE.  Kamenica (2008, p. 2140) noted that one prediction of his model is that “the 
firm could increase both its profits and social welfare by simply labeling the popularity of 
the varieties it introduces.”  As will be discussed later, one of the informational nudges 
we consider does precisely that: provide information about the relative popularity of 
different options. 
The model introduced by Kuksov and Villas-Boas (2010) focused on search costs 
during sequential decision-making processes.  They showed that the expected costs and 
subsequent expected utility associated with a choice are dependent on the distribution of 
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the alternatives.  As the number of options increase, search costs increase, and increases 
in expected utility from an additional option falls.  This tradeoff implies that the firm 
selling a product can find optimal levels of the number of options, and that these sellers 
have an incentive to match their span of options in a strategic manner by accounting for 
customer demographics. 
Other explanations of choice overload involve regret avoidance and consumer 
heterogeneity in the presence of search costs and bounded rationality.  Irons and Hepburn 
(2007) modeled regret avoidance (rather than utility maximization) as the cause of the 
ECE.  Building on Simon (1955), Schwartz et al. (2002) used a “maximizer-satisficer 
scale” to identify people who were more likely to suffer from the ECE.  If a regret-
minded maximizer were to make a choice, he might experience deep levels of regret after 
the decision when he considers the options foregone.  Inbar et al. (2011) related choice 
regret to decision speed; yet it is possible to conceptualize a strict time constraint as being 
equivalent to an increase in the relative search costs associated with evaluating another 
option.  They found that participants who feel they had enough time to evaluate an option 
experienced lower regret levels; or, that when the time allotted for a search was not 
constrained, the choice was more satisfying.  Mogilner, Rudnick, and Iyengar (2008) 
found that simply categorizing a large number of options can increase levels of 
satisfaction, which is consistent with the hypothesis that reducing search costs can 
minimize the ECE. Ultimately, these studies support the notion that heightened search 
costs and individual personalities or idosyncraices might influence the ECE. 
This chapter builds on the notion of search costs to contribute to the literature.  
Where most empirical tests of the ECE are limited to the anomaly’s existence, we move 
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the literature forward by incorporating context-specific, informational nudges in a 
marketplace likely to exhibit an ECE.  We show that even if the ECE does exist, 
marketplaces have created institutions adept at dealing with them.  By evaluating the 
effectiveness of these informational nudges, we provide an empirical test of one potential 
cause of the ECE.  We find that the effectiveness of these nudges is conditional on the 
number of options presented to the customer. 
 
 Methods 
 The primary objective of this study is to determine whether the ECE in this marketplace 
can be manipulated by informational nudges.  Our field location - a wine bar – is one 
where an ECE might exist because it targets wine drinkers who may be less 
knowledgeable of the options on an extensive craft beer menu.  This field setting 
provides three additional benefits.  First, contrary to making hypothetical, stated 
preference choices, this study provides the ability to collect revealed preference data.   
Second, collecting data in this field setting adds context to the consumers’ choices.  
Finally, because of our quasi-experimental design, consumers were unaware they were 
taking part in the experiment.  We anticipate that the wine bar’s consumers might 
appreciate a wide variety, but simply need assistance in their decision-making.  Thus, we 
expect that this environment is one in which the ECE will arise, but where it might be 
mitigated through informational nudges. 
The study utilized a 2x3 between subject quasi-experimental design that varied 
the number of options (between six and 12) and the type of menu (a control, one 
highlighting a special, and one with Beer Advocate scores).  All menus listed beers in 
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order from mildest to strongest and were structured to be similar to what the restaurant 
was already using prior to the experiment.  Data for the field experiment were collected 
from September 2, 2014, until October 31, 2014, as revenue for these days were 
anticipated to be similar across treatments.4  Six beer options were listed on the menu for 
the first half of the experiment and 12 beer options were listed on the menu for the 
remaining treatments.  Table 4.1 displays information regarding the beer options for the 
field experiment.  Prices for each beer ranged from $5.00 to $7.50 and each beer price 
was held constant throughout the experiment.  The beer with the highest Beer Advocate 
score was Great Divide Hercules IPA (92) and the beer with the lowest score was the 
Stella Artois European Pale Lager (71).  The option sets sizes were chosen so as not to 
drastically change the decision set of the restaurant’s regular patrons, as the menu 
included nine options before the experiment.  Another key concern is that order effects 
might affect the results: namely, that a temporal trend in sales might influence the 
percentage of beers sold each day.  In order to minimize the possibility that results were 
due to differences in demand across months, we ran the six-option control menu at the 
beginning and the middle of the study.  This way, we could compare the six-option 
control menu directly with the 12-option control menu.  For each of the choice set sizes, 
we utilized a control menu and the two treatment menus.  For logistical reasons, the 
treatments were changed sequentially on Monday of each week.  Prices for each option 
were held constant over the term of the experiment (the appendix shows all beer options 
that were available at each time period along with prices in each menu).  The additional 
six options of the second treatment were added between the first six options on the menu 
                                                          
4The total revenue for the days with six options was not statistically different from the total revenue for the 
weeks with twelve, implying that the study weeks were similar. 
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to constrain any positioning effects; e.g., people might be more likely to choose the 
option on the top (Dayan and Bar-Hillel 2011).   
As is inevitable in all field experiments, a certain amount of control was lost.  For 
example, changes in wait staff cannot be controlled within the data.  To minimize 
potential measurement error, two types of data are collected and merged for the primary 
analysis.  We first collected output from the restaurants sales system, which counts the 
number of beers (and other beverages) sold each day.  To supplement the data, servers 
saved drink receipts throughout the day.  While the daily sales data included all 
purchases, they do not provide a breakdown of what each consumer purchased, and one 
of the beers counted in the sales system was a draft beer listed elsewhere on the menu 
(the draft beer remained the same across weeks).  By contrast, individual ticket data are 
beneficial because each observation is customer-specific, and each receipt includes which 
beer was selected.5  We merged the two datasets by subtracting the number of draft beers 
sold each day as recorded on the sales receipts from daily beer sales. 
 
Results 
Over the course of the experiment, only 16.88% of all drinks sold were off the beer 
menu, supporting our hypothesis that the consumers at this wine bar did not have strong 
preferences for craft beer relative to non-beer alternatives.  A chi-square test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the probability of selling a beer is independent of the number of 
options and the menu treatments (i.e., the presence/absence of an ECE depends on the 
                                                          
5 Because the wait staff collected the daily sales data, 30.5% of the 787 total beers ordered are not 
accounted for within the daily sales data, but are accounted within the data collected by the restaurant sales 
system. 
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menu treatment).  Table 4.2 shows the number of beers chosen as a percentage of all 
drinks chosen in the field experiment.  Increasing the number of options from six to 12 
decreased the percent beverage purchases accounted for by beer sales from 16.86% to 
13.64%.  Compared to the six-option control menu, highlighting a special increased beer 
sales from 16.86% to 20.14% and Beer Advocate scores increased sales to 19.93%.  The 
special appears to lose its effectiveness when the number of options increased – only 
13.25% of drink sales were from beer if 12 options were present.  Compared to the 12-
option control menu, Beer Advocate scores increased the percentage of beer sales from 
13.64% to 20.44%. 
For the control, beer sales as a percentage of all drink sales decreased as the 
number of options increased, indicating that an ECE exists in this field location.  The 
odds of a beer being purchased when 12 options are offered is 0.959 times that if 12 
options were offered in the control.  Adding a special to the menu amplified the issue; the 
odds of a beer being purchased when 12 options and a special are present is 0.920 that if 
12 options were offered with the same special.  There was no ECE when Beer Advocate 
scores were on the menu.  In the six-option set, adding specials or Beer Advocate scores 
increased the odds a customer purchased a beer.  In fact, Beer Advocate scores increased 
the odds a beer was purchased when the number of menu items increased to 12 beers.  
The odds a beer was purchased from the six-option control menu was 1.005 times the 
odds a beer was purchased from the 12-option menu with Beer Advocate scores. 
 The effectiveness of specials and scores appear to vary depending on the number 
of available options.  Specials appear to be more effective in the smaller choice set than 
in the larger choice set.  The odds of purchasing a beer when the special was listed with 
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six options is 1.244 times the control and 0.968 times the 12-option control.  Scores 
increased the odds a beer is purchased by 1.627 times when 12 options were provided, 
but only increased the odds of a purchase by 1.227 in the six-option menu.  However, 
because the 95% confidence intervals overlap, we cannot conclude that there is a 
statistically significant difference in effects. 
 As shown in figure 4.1, if the bar were to offer twelve options with a standard 
menu, it would expect to sell fewer beers than if it only provided six options.  Specials 
would be likely to increase the probability of selecting a beer when the number of options 
are only six, but this increase in probability dissipates when the number of options 
increase to twelve.  Finally, the Beer Advocate scores would have the most lasting impact 
on beer sales.  Where both specials and scores increase the probability of selection by 
roughly the same amount in the six-option set, the scores significantly reduce the 
excessive choice effect.  
 These results face several limitations.  As previously mentioned, research in the 
field requires some loss of control.  We cannot know for which customers the beer menu 
constituted a consideration set, making causal conclusions regarding search costs 
arduous.  While this is a fair criticism, much of the ECE literature has followed a similar 
identification strategy.  Ideally, we would have been able to alternate 6-beer and 12-beer 
treatments, or randomized treatments each week over a longer set of weeks to minimize 
temporal effects.  To address these concerns, we ran the six-option control menu the 
week before we ran the twelve-option control menu.  If a temporal effect is in fact driving 
these findings, we would expect there to be a significant difference in sales between the 
first week (six beer control menu) and the fifth week (the twelve beer control menu), but 
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that the difference would be less substantial when comparing the fifth (also a six beer 
control menu) and six weeks.  When we just compare the fifth and six weeks, we can 
reject the null hypothesis that the six- and twelve-option control weeks sold the same 
amount of beer (χ1
2 = 5.67, 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.017).  
  
Discussion 
While this research does not provide decisive evidence that the excessive choice effect is 
a function of search costs, it does show that the effect itself can be manipulated through 
search-cost-minimizing nudges.  It is important to remember that markets include 
heterogeneous buyers and sellers.  Buyers generally self-select into different markets 
based on their own preferences and personalities, and sellers have an incentive to make 
the transaction.  As such, it is possible that the average craft beer consumer does not 
experience the choice paralysis endemic of the ECE.  Rather, the ECE is likely to be 
reserved to specific consumer groups within narrowly defined contexts (Authors, 2017). 
This research provides an example of how some sellers meet consumer demands 
by either increasing or decreasing the number of options.  Adding informational nudges 
such as product ratings or specials to a menu might encourage consumers to select an 
option when there are few options in differing contexts.  This might be why some bars 
specialize in providing a large number of options; to target novelty-seeking craft beer 
drinkers.  Environments full of familiar buyers will more often find a beer to drink if a 
menu lists specials or scores; however, added information can overwhelm unfamiliar 
buyers even more as the choice becomes more difficult to process. 
73 
 
Moving forward, other search-cost-reducing informational nudges might be 
analyzed in this market and in others.  Especially with experience goods, information 
agents such as bartenders or social networks might mitigate the ECE.  Similar to Beer 
Advocate scores, ratings and reports have the potential of minimizing search costs in 
other marketplaces.  Firms such as Amazon and Uber provide five-star rating 
mechanisms to assist consumers in finding the utility-maximizing choice.  A next step in 
this research might be to explore how prices interact with the ECE and the effect of these 
informational nudges.  For example, listing a special with a significantly different price 
than the other options might have a stronger effect on sales than simply reducing the 
price without indicating it as a special.  Ratings might be more important when 
comparing like products with similar prices as compared to like products with dissimilar 
prices (or unlike products with similar prices).   
This research argues that firms have developed marketing strategies to help customers 
more appropriately identify choices that suit their desires.  We validate the results of 
Kamenica (2008) and Norwood (2006), namely, that search costs influence the 
consequences of the excessive choice effect.  Regardless of the information’s relevance, 
increasing the volume of information in a marketplace causes search costs to change.  We 
show that search-cost-lowering mechanisms used in markets have different effects on the 
probability of purchase.  If consumers are relatively unfamiliar with choice options, 
sellers increase sales by offering fewer options and highlighting preferred varieties.  
However, if consumers are familiar, sellers offer more options and allow consumers to 
choose for themselves.  
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Figure 4.1. Probability of not selecting a beer in field experiment (note: upward sloping 
line indicates presence of an excessive choice effect) 
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Table 4.1. Beer options for the field experiment 
Brewery Name Origin Price ($) 
Beer 
Advocate 
Score 
Dates 
Available 
Hoegaarden Witbier Belgium 5.50 85 10/5-10/25 
Marshall Old Pavilion Pilsner Oklahoma 5.50 84 
9/2-9/14, 
10/5-10/25 
Coop DNR Belgian Strong Ale Oklahoma 7.50 84 10/5-10/25 
Stella Artois European Pale Lager Belgium 5.50 71 9/2-10/25 
Big Sky 
Trout Slayer Pale Wheat 
Ale 
Montana 5.00 82 10/5-10/25 
Great Divide Hercules Double IPA Colorado 7.50 92 9/2-10/25 
Boulevard Hibiscus Gose Missouri 5.50 87 10/5-10/25 
Rogue Mocha Porter Oregon 7.50 87 9/2-10/25 
Kostritzer Schwarzbier Black Beer Germany 6.00 88 10/5-10/25 
Steelhead Extra Stout California 6.00 90 9/2-10/25 
Founders 
Dirty Bastard Scotch 
Ale 
Michigan 5.50 90 10/5-10/25 
Coop Horny Toad Blonde Oklahoma 5.50 75 9/14-10/4 
Angry Orchard Crisp Apple Cider Ohio 5.50 N/A 9/2-10/25 
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Table 4.2.  Beer sales as a percentage of all drink sales in field experiment 
Treatment 
Number of Options Odds Ratio - Effect of 
Number of Optionsa N=6 N=12 
Control 16.86% 13.64% 0.959 
[0.907, 1.014]b 
Special 20.14% 13.25% 0.920 
[0.867, 0.976] 
Beer Advocate Scores 19.93% 20.44% 1.005 
[0.958, 1.055] 
Odds Ratio - Effects of Special and Scoresc  
Control to Special 1.244 
[0.922, 1.678] 
0.968 
[0.661, 1.417] 
 
Control to Scores 1.227 
[0.929, 1.620] 
1.627 
[1.154, 2.295] 
 
aOdds ratio is the odds of beer being purchased in the N=6 treatment (i.e., the proportion of drink sales that 
are beer divided by the proportion of drink sales that are not beer) divided by the odds of beer being 
purchased in the N=12 treatment.   An odds ratio less than one is indicative of an excessive choice effect. 
bNumbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals assuming each drink purchased represents an 
independent choice 
cOdds ratio is the odds of beer being chosen in the control or specials menu (i.e., the proportion of times 
beer is chosen divided by the proportion of times beer was not chosen) divided by the odds of beer being 
chosen in the control menu.   An odds ratio greater than one indicates the specials/scores increased beer 
sales relative to the control. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Recent findings from behavioral economists have called into question some of the 
standard assumptions maintained in econometric analysis.  As such, the objective of this 
dissertation was to contribute to the reconciliation of these behavioral principles to 
economic theory.  In the first chapter, we described a new method for reducing 
inattention bias in consumer surveys, and then showed how inattention bias can alter 
policy recommendations in the context of a beer tax.  In the second chapter, we proposed 
and implemented a new way to distinguish brand perceptions from brand preferences.  
This approach showed how, relative to domestic macrobrew labels, a consumer’s 
decision to purchase craft beer relates more to the perceived taste of the beer rather than 
the consumer’s familiarity with the brand.  In the third chapter, we conducted a field 
experiment focused on a small portion of craft beer consumers to determine the 
consequences of the excessive choice effect in market interactions.  This study found 
that, although the ECE is likely to exist for some consumers, sellers have developed 
mechanisms targeted at reducing its negative consequences. 
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 Given recent changes in the food value chain, future research might benefit by 
considering the behavioral principles outlined in this dissertation.  At a minimum, 
discrete choice modelers might benefit by considering inattention bias in their study 
sample via a mechanism such as the Random Response Share (Malone and Lusk, 2017c).  
Demand modeling might benefit by separating perceptions and preferences within the 
utility function of their participants.  Finally, future research might also benefit from 
identifying how markets interact with other apparent behavioral anomalies, such as time 
inconsistent preferences or sunk costs.   
While each chapter contributes to a unique strand of literature, a unifying lesson 
can be gleaned from reading all three chapters together.  Namely, that behavioral 
principles can enrich understanding of human action, and can remind economists to 
reassess the core principles of the discipline.  By considering potential cognitive issues 
such as inattention bias, econometric models might more accurately determine policy 
impacts.  Inconsistencies in perceptions need not generate “predictably irrational” 
preferences.  Even Hayek (1952) alleged malleable perceptions as an additional reason 
for the necessity of the market and suggested that economic models include both 
preferences and perceptions.  Additionally, when “cognitive failures” such as the 
excessive choice effect seem to challenges assumptions of economic theory, it is 
important to recall that markets are simply a dynamic collaboration between buyers and 
sellers.  As such, the unifying lesson from this dissertation can be traced to Adam Smith’s 
(1776, pp. 25) insight: “This division of labour, from which so many advantages are 
derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends 
that general opulence to which it gives occasion.  It is the necessary, though very slow 
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and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no 
such extensive utility; the propensity to truck barter, and exchange once thing for 
another.”  
 
. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
By comparing models that allow for differences in scale variance, we can determine 
whether differences in models represent differences in preferences or differences in 
relative scale (Swait and Louviere, 1993).  Table 2.A1 shows model estimates for the 
treatment with the embedded short trap question.  The likelihood ratio test indicates that 
adding a scale parameter does not significantly improve the model’s fit; however, 
dividing the dataset into two groups is a better fit.  By conducting another likelihood ratio 
test, we determine that responses from those that incorrectly answered the trap question 
were statistically different from those who correctly answered the trap question the first 
time (𝜒𝑑𝑓=1,0.05
2 = 126, p − value < 0.001).  We conclude that participants who 
correctly and incorrectly responded to the trap question displayed different preferences 
from each other.  The parameters that inflated were those for the most popular beer 
choices, while the parameters for the craft options actually converged to zero.  For 
example, the price parameter for the Marshall Pilsner decreased to -0.082, making its 
value not significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  Table 2.A2 shows model 
estimates for the treatment with the long trap question.  In this instance, the likelihood 
ratio test indicates that adding a relative scale parameter improves the goodness-of-fit.   
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By conducting a likelihood ratio test, we determine that responses from those that 
incorrectly answered the trap question were statistically different from those who 
correctly answered the trap question the first time (𝜒𝑑𝑓=12,0.05
2 = 145, p − value <
0.001).  The results in this treatment follow a pattern similar to that exhibited by the 
above short trap question treatment, although more parameters lose their statistical 
significance.  Five of the incorrect participant model’s twelve parameter estimates are not 
statistically significant from zero.  Again, parameter estimates for incorrect participants 
are not all higher than those who responded correctly.  For example, while the Budweiser 
parameter estimate is 1.621 for incorrect participants, it is 1.968 for correct participants.  
For Miller Lite, we observe a parameter of 1.821 for incorrect participants and a 
parameter of 1.167 for incorrect participants. 
Table 2.A3 shows the parameter estimates for those who missed the trap 
questions and did not revise to correct their wrong response versus those who did revise.   
When notified of their wrong response in the short trap question group, 53 of the 122 
originally incorrect responses changed their response to a correct answer.  Parameter 
estimates for persons who revised their responses were statistically different from those 
who did not revise their responses. (𝜒𝑑𝑓=12,0.05
2 = 35, p − value < 0.001).  Parameter 
estimates are different for those who correctly revised their responses.  For example, the 
Corona parameter nearly doubled when comparing revising participants with non-
revising participants.  When notified of their wrong answer in the long trap question, 98 
of the 150 originally incorrect responses changed their response to a correct answer.  
Parameter estimates for participants who correctly revised their responses to the long trap 
question were statistically different from those who did not correctly revise their 
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responses (𝜒𝑑𝑓=12,0.05
2 = 32, p − value < 0.001).  Those who did not revise their 
responses responded more randomly than those who did revise their responses – fewer 
parameters were statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  The participants who do revise 
their responses to the long trap question are statistically different from the participants 
who correctly responded the first time (𝜒𝑑𝑓=12,0.05
2 = 46, p − value < 0.001), but the 
majority of the variation comes from those who do not revise their answers, as those 
participants were statistically different from the rest of the sample (𝜒𝑑𝑓=12,0.05
2 = 83, p −
value < 0.001). 
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Table 2.A1. Multinomial logit model estimates for the embedded trap question treatment 
Variable MNL  
Relative scale 
parameter  
Correct 
respondents  
Incorrect 
respondents 
Price of Miller 
Lite 
-0.253*a  (0.030)b -0.231*  (0.030) -0.285* d (0.038) -0.197*  (0.053) 
Price of 
Budweiser 
-0.246*  (0.025) -0.224*  (0.026) -0.284*  (0.029) -0.131*  (0.051) 
Price of Corona -0.226*  (0.023) -0.203*  (0.024) -0.231*  (0.026) -0.215*  (0.055) 
Price of Samuel 
Adams Lager 
-0.219*  (0.028) -0.195*  (0.028) -0.201*  (0.032) -0.272*  (0.057) 
Price of Oskar 
Blues Pilsner 
-0.334*  (0.049) -0.306*  (0.047) -0.370*  (0.055) -0.215*  (0.104) 
     
Price of Marshall 
Pilsner 
-0.284*  (0.037) -0.258*  (0.036) -0.316*  (0.040) -0.082   (0.098) 
Miller Lite  1.697*  (0.142)  1.524*  (0.161)  1.626*  (0.171)  2.026*  (0.267) 
Budweiser  2.124*  (0.124)  1.918*  (0.159)  2.227*  (0.141)  1.828*  (0.262) 
Corona  2.260*  (0.117)  2.037*  (0.161)  2.328*  (0.130)  2.005*  (0.273) 
Samuel Adams 
Lager 
 1.743*  (0.134)  1.555*  (0.158)  1.605*  (0.153)  2.192*  (0.277) 
Oskar Blues 
Pilsner 
 1.080*  (0.208)  0.993*  (0.194)  1.225*  (0.233)  0.590   (0.466) 
Marshall Pilsner  1.412*  (0.166)  1.287*  (0.163)  1.632*  (0.179)  0.068   (0.468) 
Scale parameter c   1.139*  (0.083)   
     
Log likelihood -7929.5 -7928 -6158 -1708.5 
AIC 15883 15882 12340 3441 
Number of 
observations 
 4472  4472 3496    976 
Number of 
participants 
   559   559  437    122 
a * designates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
b Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
c Scale parameter is the scale of correct participant relative to the incorrect participants, 
with the latter normalized to one. 
d To compare these parameter estimates to the MNL with a relative scale parameter, the 
parameters for the MNL with correct respondents should be multiplied by the scale 
parameter value (1.139). 
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Table 2.A2. Multinomial logit model estimates for the long trap question treatment 
Variable MNL 
Relative scale 
parameter 
Correct 
respondents  
Incorrect 
respondents 
Price of Miller 
Lite 
  -0.291*a (0.032)b -0.230*  (0.029) -0.311* d (0.038)   -0.254*  (0.059) 
Price of 
Budweiser 
-0.250*  (0.024) -0.206*  (0.021) -0.331*  (0.028)   -0.054   (0.044) 
Price of Corona -0.266*  (0.023) -0.215*  (0.022) -0.325*  (0.027)   -0.087   (0.046) 
Price of Samuel 
Adams Lager 
-0.301*  (0.029) -0.245*  (0.026) 
  -0.380*  
(0.036) 
  -0.136*  (0.050) 
Price of Oskar 
Blues Pilsner 
-0.416*  (0.057) -0.347*  (0.049) -0.526*  (0.075)   -0.213*  (0.093) 
Price of Marshall 
Pilsner 
-0.289*  (0.037) -0.236*  (0.032) -0.356*  (0.044)   -0.093   (0.074) 
     
Miller Lite  1.270*  (0.142)  0.970*  (0.129)  1.167*  (0.167)    1.821*  (0.277) 
Budweiser  1.801*  (0.113)  1.417*  (0.123)  1.968*  (0.131)    1.621*  (0.232) 
Corona 1.941*  (0.111)  1.523*  (0.126)  2.093*  (0.126)    1.629*  (0.240) 
Samuel Adams 
Lager 
    1.548*  (0.130)  1.206*  (0.126)  1.644*  (0.156)    1.631*  (0.253) 
Oskar Blues 
Pilsner 
0.661*  (0.231)  0.560*  (0.186)  0.858*  (0.287)    0.625   (0.417) 
Marshall Pilsner     0.910*  (0.164)  0.736*  (0.133)  1.086*  (0.187)    0.529   (0.356) 
Scale parameter c   1.366*  (0.098)   
     
Log likelihood -8307.5 -8296.5 -6104 -2131 
AIC 16639 16619 12232 4286 
Number of 
observations 
 4728  4728 3528  1200 
Number of 
participants 
   591   591   441   150 
a * designates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
b Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
c Scale parameter is the scale of correct participant relative to the incorrect participants, 
with the latter normalized to one. 
d To compare these parameter estimates to the MNL with a relative scale parameter, the 
parameters for the MNL with correct respondents should be multiplied by the scale 
parameter value (1.366). 
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Table 2.A3. Multinomial logit model for participants who missed the trap question in the 
beer choice experiment 
 Embedded short trap question Long trap question 
Variable  
Revised 
correctly 
Revised 
incorrectly 
Revised 
correctly 
Revised 
incorrectly 
Price of Miller Lite -0.204*  (0.081)  -0.191*a (0.070)b -0.301*  (0.074)  -0.167    (0.098) 
Price of Budweiser -0.073    (0.075)  -0.180*  (0.070) -0.058    (0.055)  -0.047     (0.073) 
Price of Corona -0.322*  (0.090)  -0.144*  (0.071) -0.162*  (0.056)   0.088    (0.086) 
Price of Samuel 
Adams Lager 
-0.318*  (0.087)  -0.237*  (0.076) -0.115    (0.065)  -0.170*   (0.080) 
Price of Oskar 
Blues Pilsner 
-0.141    (0.121)  -0.420    (0.221) -0.293*  (0.129)  -0.110    (0.137) 
Price of Marshall 
Pilsner 
-0.012    (0.161)  -0.125    (0.125) -0.168    (0.096)   0.019    (0.118) 
Miller Lite  2.630* (0.438)   1.711*  (0.344)  1.839*  (0.337)   1.922*  (0.497) 
Budweiser  2.218* (0.428)   1.692*  (0.342)  1.421*  (0.284)   2.128*  (0.416) 
Corona  2.949* (0.456)   1.470*  (0.350)  1.881*  (0.281)   1.067*  (0.480) 
Samuel Adams 
Lager 
 2.997* (0.449)   1.720*  (0.363)  1.249*  (0.320)   2.434*  (0.433) 
Oskar Blues Pilsner  1.375* (0.599)   0.370    (0.878)  0.606    (0.550)   0.908    (0.663) 
Marshall Pilsner  0.172   (0.801)   0.070    (0.581)  0.595    (0.445)   0.636    (0.611) 
     
Log likelihood -730 -960.5 -1380 -735 
AIC 1484 1945 2784 1494 
Number of 
observations 
 424  552  784  416 
Number of 
participants 
  53   69   98   52 
a * designates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
b Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
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